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This research examines how technical risk management has evolved throughout 
the Department of the Navy (DoN) and to what extent acquisition programs have 
implemented best practice methods and techniques.  A sample of DoN program 
managers, risk managers, and other acquisition professionals was surveyed to determine 
attitudes on technical risk management and what fundamental methods are being applied.  
Survey data was also collected to determine what impact Department of Defense (DoD) 
and DoN technical risk guidance has had on the acquisition community and what 
guidance documents are being used.  For cases where best-in-class technical risk 
management methods and techniques have not been applied, this research offers some 
potential solutions.   
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Technical risk management is the assessment and management of risk related to 
the lack of critical engineering disciplines during the design, development, and 
production of a system.  Technical risk is the driver behind all other risk including cost 
and schedule risk.  In 1985, the Defense Science Board claimed that once rigorous and 
disciplined engineering practices were employed and institutionalized, the risk of 
deploying unsuitable weapon systems would be low and the time in the acquisition cycle 
would be reduced (DoD 4245.7-M, 1985, p. 1).  This is still true today with the focus on 
the systems engineering process as the means to ensure key engineering disciplines have 
been implemented.  Technical risk management methods and techniques measure how 
well engineering disciplines have been applied and provide an early warning to 
potentially costly problems from surfacing later in the acquisition cycle.   
A 1997 survey of 41 Navy program offices by ASN(RD&A)ABM revealed no 
common or consistent methodology for technical risk management.  As a result, 
ASN(RD&A)ABM released a guidance document (NAVSO P-3686) for program 
managers in October 1998 containing technical risk management best practices.  The 
document was entitled, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk.  After nearly four 
years, a review of this document’s impact on the Navy acquisition community was 
studied in this thesis.      
 A sample of Department of the Navy (DoN) program managers, risk managers, 
and other acquisition professionals was surveyed to determine attitudes on technical risk 
management and what fundamental methods are being applied.  Survey data was also 
collected to determine what impact Department of Defense (DoD) and DoN technical risk 
guidance has had on the acquisition community and what guidance documents are being 
used.  For cases where best-in-class technical risk management methods and techniques 
have not been applied, this research offers some potential solutions.     
This research obtained the following results and conclusions: 
 
 xvii
• There has been a tremendous evolution of technical risk management methods and 
techniques within DoN over the course of nearly 20 years driven by acquisition 
reform. 
• Although risk management and assessment is clearly part of a program manger’s tool 
kit today, technical risk management methods and techniques have not been 
institutionalized throughout the Navy. 
• There is need for more technical risk management training throughout the Navy 
acquisition community.  20% of those surveyed have not received risk training.   
• Technical risk management is very important to the success of an acquisition 
program. 
• Qualitative technical risk management methods are predominately used within the 
Navy. 
• There is a definite correlation between systems engineering and technical risk 
management. 
• Incentives for applying technical risk management methods and techniques are 
lacking. 
• Unmitigated Process risk leads to Product risk. 
• A risk awareness or risk friendly culture where program risks are openly discussed 
has not been fully institutionalized within the Navy.   
• Nearly one-third of those surveyed don’t apply software risk management methods. 
• 36% of those surveyed have used or are using NAVSO P-3686.  44% have used or 
are using DoD 4245.7-M (Willoughby Templates), NAVSO P-6071 (Best Practices), 
or Methods & Metrics for Product Success as guidance for their technical risk 
management programs. 
• Approximately 70% of those surveyed did not know what technical risk guidance 
documents their contractor’s were using.  30% used the same guidance documents as 
their contractors.   
• Nearly 20% of those surveyed believe DoD, SECNAV, and NAVSEA risk 
management policy was inadequate.  Another 40% were neutral on this issue. 
• Nearly 20% of those surveyed were dissatisfied with their risk management programs 
and another 40% were neutral. 
 
Although the Navy has made strides over the course of 20 years with technical 
risk management awareness and need, there are still weaknesses in the application and 
implementation of proactive technical risk management methods and the open 
communication of risk within the Navy acquisition community.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A. ACQUISITION REFORM – A CULTURAL CHANGE  
1994 marked a significant cultural change in the way the Department of Defense 
(DoD) does business.  Three major events occurred which mandated this change.  In 
February, Secretary of Defense Dr. William Perry issued a mandate for change (DSMC, 
2002a, ¶ 3) in a paper to all defense departments and agencies entitled, Acquisition 
Reform:  A Mandate for Change.  This paper provided a conceptual look at DoD’s 
approach to acquisition reform.  Defenselink’s Web Site states,  “DoD will 
institutionalize business processes that facilitate affordable and timely delivery of best-
value products and services that meet warfighter needs.”  (Defenselink, 2002a, ¶ 3).  In 
June, Secretary Perry issued a memorandum to all defense departments and agencies 
directing the replacement of all military standards and specifications with commercial 
specifications (Perry, 1994).  Use of military specifications and standards were 
authorized only as a last resort and if a waiver was granted.  Finally, in October, the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act was signed into law, which overhauled the 
bureaucratic, complex, and cumbersome procurement process within the federal 
government (DSMC, 2002b, ¶ 1).  The Act mandated that DoD, “increase the use of 
commercially available items where practicable, place more emphasis on past contractor 
performance, and promote best value rather than simply low cost in selecting sources of 
supplies and services.”  (Powell, J. E., 2002, p. 65). 
With these defining events acquisition reform was born.  Defense Systems 
Management College (DSMC), now known as Defense Acquisition University (DAU), 
defines this cultural change as: 
Acquisition reform, a theory pervasive throughout the Department of 
Defense, is an endeavor to make the acquisition process more effective, 
efficient, and productive.  It involves reducing overhead, streamlining 
requirements, speeding up processes, cutting paperwork and other similar 
initiatives to reduce bureaucracy.  Acquisition reform includes a move 
toward the use of commercial practices as well as the use of private 
enterprise to do more of the functions traditionally done by government. 
(DSMC, 2002c, ¶ 1) 
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 On 10 May 1995, Secretary Perry issued a memorandum to the Service 
Secretaries mandating the use of Integrated Product Teams (IPT) throughout the 
acquisition process (“Why Do We Need IPTs?”, 2002, ¶ 1).  This decision was based on 
Boeing’s success with Integrated Product & Process Development (IPPD) on the 777 
Program (Schaeffer, 1997, p. 51).  This author believes this IPT mandate has been one of 
the few quantifiable successes of acquisition reform.  In his memo Secretary Perry 
defined IPPD as, “A management process that integrates all activities from product 
concept through production/field support, using a multi-functional team, to 
simultaneously optimize the product and its manufacturing and sustainment processes to 
meet cost and performance objectives.”  (“IPPD definitions,” 1995, ¶ 2)  The memo lists 
10 key tenets of IPPD with number 10 being “Proactive Identification and Management 
of Risk.”  This effectively makes risk analysis and management a key responsibility of 
IPTs.  It requires critical cost, schedule, and performance parameters to be identified by 
IPTs using a risk analysis (assessment) process.  It also requires that performance 
measures (i.e., metrics) be identified and compared to industry benchmarks and best 
practices for cost, schedule, and performance control and achievement of technical and 
business parameters.  (“IPPD definitions,” 1995, ¶ 2)  This best practice and lessons 
learned approach to technical risk management is precisely the approach followed by 
many within the Navy and will be described in subsequent chapters.  Measuring the 
variance between a program’s practice and a government or industry best practice is an 
effective technical risk management approach which mitigates process related risk early 
before it is manifested in the product (hardware/software).   
Reig (Reig, 2000, pp. 33-36) provides an excellent summary of acquisition reform 
events.  Table 1 provides a chronology of significant acquisition reform events in the 
1990s.  Table 2 provides an alphabetical list of acquisition reform initiatives. 
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Table 1.     Chronology of Acquisition Reform Events. From (Reig, 2000, pp. 35-36)    
      (continued) 
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 There is one significant event missing from Reig’s chronology which is worthy of 
mention because it had a significant impact on acquisition reform and operational and 
technical authority within DoD.  The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act had a profound impact on the DoD requirements generation system 
and the players involved in establishing the mission need and advancing warfighting 
requirements.  It also significantly altered the responsibility for acquisition oversight.   
Goldwater-Nichols centralized operational authority through the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs (CJCS) (NDUL, 2002, ¶ 1).  CJCS acts as a spokesman for the Commander 
In Chiefs (CINC) integrating and prioritizing their requirements.  Prior to this Act, the 
Service Chiefs defined their own requirements, and they often were more concerned with 
maintaining and promoting their own interests.  (Osgood, 1996, ¶ 5)  Goldwater-Nichols 
put in place a joint operational approach under the exclusive command of the CINC on 
the battlefield.  It instilled a joint service approach to requirements generation eliminating 
often duplicative approaches from the Services.  The Services went from defining 
requirements and leading operations prior to Goldwater-Nichols to providing capabilities 
to the CINCs (Goldwater-Nichols,” n.d., p. 14).   
Goldwater-Nichols also created a civilian controlled acquisition function moving 
the responsibility for oversight from the military to a civilian acquisition executive under 
each Service Secretary.  This legislature empowered program managers to be the single 
authority for their acquisition programs reporting to the civilian acquisition executive.  
Within the Department of the Navy (DoN) acquisition Program Managers (PM) and 
Program Executive Officers (PEO) report directly to Office of Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Research, Development and Acquisition ASN(RD&A).  The objective was to 
streamline the acquisition organization, processes, and communication within the 
acquisition community.  What it did instead was to divest the program managers from a 
technical authority framework within the Services.  This technical authority provided 
checks and balances on the implementation of critical engineering disciplines. 
Goldwater-Nichols removed these checks and balances and left it up to the PMs to decide 
what was best for their programs.  Often, PMs chose not to implement key disciplines 
 6
and practices because of budget constraints, lack of knowledge, or schedule issues.  They 
knowingly and sometimes unknowingly took risks by failing to implement key 
disciplines.  It’s ironic that their failure to implement key disciplines and engineering 
practices actually result in program risk.  Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, Headquarters 
Commands maintained staffs of technical experts responsible for providing technical 
oversight of acquisition programs.  After this Act became law, these commands lost 
much of their technical talent to downsizing actions and delegation to field activities.   
Today, the technical expertise resides at the field activities.  However, it remains 
at the discretion of the PEOs/PMs whether their technical experts within the field 
activities are consulted.  Since the Warfare Centers and Laboratories are Working Capital 
Fund activities, there is a competitive push for PEO/PM business.  Often PEOs/PMs task  
field activities most familiar to them and not necessarily the subject matter experts.  This 
is an issue within the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) because there are no 
formal and consistent engineering and technical authority assignments.  Current 
NAVSEA policy leaves it up to the PEOs/PMs to make engineering agent assignments 
for their particular programs.  They often choose those field activities most familiar to 
them, and they may not necessarily task the leading technical authority in a particular 
area of interest. 
Goldwater-Nichols had as much impact on technical risk management as the 
acquisition reform initiatives already discussed.  It is interesting that the literature on 
acquisition reform rarely discusses this linkage.  Divesting the technical authority and 
oversight for acquisition systems from the military to a separately reporting civilian 
reporting chain, resulted in significant impacts on warfighting readiness.  However, 
Goldwater-Nichols did not act alone.  Acquisition reform allowed the PEOs/PMs to pick 
and choose the engineering disciplines they applied to their programs.  Often they waived 
key processes and disciplines, which resulted in technical risk.  Because today’s decisions 
affect tomorrow’s product, the risk often was manifested in hardware and software 
products later in the acquisition timeline.     
Acquisition reform also brought with it a cultural change on how DoD and DoN 
viewed risk.  Traditional risk avoidance techniques were replaced with risk management 
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methods.  Program/project managers and other acquisition personnel had to think about 
potential program risks and manage their impact on acquisition programs.  Risk 
management was now a key component of program/project management and required 
due consideration and planning throughout the acquisition life-cycle.  Resources for risk 
mitigation had to be planned for and loaded into the program/project schedules.   Dr. Paul 
Kaminski, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, was a 
firm believer that a cultural change was necessary for reform and it also necessitated a 
change in how we viewed risk.  Dr. Kaminski states, 
…it has become obvious to me that we will need to transform the risk 
averse culture that has grown up within the department over the years.  I 
can not direct this cultural change—we need ‘buy in’ by all of you, the 
major stakeholders.  Unless this occurs, we will not develop the trust ‘n’ 
teamwork that it takes to implement the Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
concept.  The department’s top leadership must create a climate for 
reasoned risk-taking—otherwise we will never exploit the opportunities 
that may be within reach.  (DSMC, 2002d,  ¶ 4) 
 
Dr. Kaminski eloquently characterizes transforming the risk culture resulting from 
acquisition reform initiatives.  He also discusses the importance of gaining buy-in from 
the acquisition community.   He recognized that cultural change is difficult and requires 
acceptance by all those involved.  Unless this buy-in occurs, IPTs would not be focused 
and aligned toward common goals including promulgating acquisition reform initiatives 
and identifying and mitigating risk.   
Finally, Dr. Kaminski discusses the role of top leadership in this cultural change.  
With any cultural change of this magnitude top leadership must support the change by 
creating a working environment conducive to the change.  Dr. Kaminski says top 
leadership must allow managed risk taking.  Risk taking is necessary in order to take 
advantage of opportunity.  Top leaders must not punish those who identify risk, i.e., 
“shoot the messenger approach.”  There is risk in every program, therefore leadership 
must accept this fact and carry on with a sound risk management approach to reduce the 
risk to acceptable levels.  The key lies in identifying risk, so it can be managed.  The Risk 
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vs. Opportunities approach is a fundamental aspect of technical risk management within 
the Navy today and a direct result of acquisition reform.      
Nearly 10 years later, there are still those entrenched in senior leadership 
positions who don’t want to hear bad news.  They chastise those who bring high risks to 
the table creating an atmosphere of distrust and adversarial relationships.  Opportunities 
cannot be realized without risk taking.  The key is managing the risk, so it does not 
adversely impact cost, schedule, and performance parameters.  An atmosphere of 
managed risk taking should be encouraged by Navy leadership.  PMs must know that 
they will not be punished for reporting High risks up the chain.  A risk awareness culture 
must permeate all levels of the acquisition community.  One of the Technical Risk 
Management Survey questions contained in this research addresses this cultural issue.  If 
risks are known, they can then be tracked, managed, and reduced to acceptable levels.  
This author believes the Navy has not completely deployed a risk awareness culture, and 
it is the direct result of poor support from top Navy leadership.  The results of the survey 
support this contention.  Dr. Kaminski was right on the mark when he spoke about this 
transformation nearly 10 years ago.      
 
B. THE ORIGIN OF STANDARDS & SPECIFICATIONS 
Some believe about 3000 years ago the Egyptians established a standard for the 
unit of length.  It was called the Royal Egyptian Cubit.  The Royal Cubit Master was 
carved from a block of granite to last forever.  Its length was equal to the length of the 
forearm from the bent elbow to the tip of the extended middle finger plus the width of the 
palm of the hand of the Pharaoh ruling at the time.   The workers building the pyramids, 
tombs, and temples were supplied with cubit sticks made from wood or granite equal to 
the length of the Royal Cubit Master.  The Royal Architect or foreman of each 
construction site was responsible for ensuring that the workers cubit sticks matched the 
length of and was traceable to the master.  This comparison was required at each full 
moon and failure to do so was punishable by death.  The story of the Royal Cubit Master 
is depicted in the Egyptian papyrus shown in Figure 1.  (NCSL, 2002, Papyrus story) 
 9
Although this punishment was severe the ancient Egyptians knew the value of 
standards and traceability.  Standardization helped the Egyptians achieve great accuracy.  
“The Great Pyramid of Giza was constructed to stand roughly a 756 feet or  
9,069.4 inches.  Using cubit sticks, the builders were within 4.5 inches – an accuracy of 




Figure 1. The Royal Egyptian Cubit Papyrus. From (NCSL, 2002, Papyrus story) 
 
It is apparent that the ancient Egyptians were firm believers of managing risk 
through avoidance.  They did this by the establishing a set of standards and practices to 
live by that had to be followed without question or suffer severe consequences. 
The ancient Romans were also advocates of standardization and developed many 
military standards and specifications.  One in particular has pervaded our modern culture.   
The U.S. standard railroad gauge, which is defined as the distance between the 
rails, is 4 feet 8.5 inches.  This is an odd size, which begs the question, why?  The answer 
lies in our historical ties to England and their past ties to the Roman Empire.  English 
expatriates built the U.S. railroads and that was the gauge they used in England.  The first 
railroads in England were built by the same people who built the tramways.  Tramways 
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pre-dated the railway system in England and that was the gauge they used.  Those who 
built the tramways used the same fixtures and tooling that was used to build wagons, so 
wagons were built with a wheel spacing of the same gauge.  This odd wheel spacing was 
used because it exactly matched the spacing of the old wheel ruts in the ancient roads that 
were built by the Romans for their legions to travel on.  Wagons had to match the old 
wheel rut configuration or risk being destroyed.  The wheel spacing was exactly that of a 
Roman war chariot, which was a military item under standard and specification control.  
The wheel spacing on a chariot was just wide enough to accommodate the rear ends of 
two war horses!  (“The railroad gauge,”  n.d., p. 1) 
 
C. MOBILIZATION FOR WAR – THE IMPACT OF STANDARDS & 
SPECIFICATIONS 
The middle of the nineteenth century marked the modern era’s process for 
preparing for war.  The era of mobilization was born with the start of the Civil War.  
Mobilization is the process by which a nation transitions from a normal state of 
peacetime preparedness to a war-fighting posture by assembling, organizing, and 
applying its resources for national defense.  (“Master mobilization plan,” 1988, ¶ 2)  The 
Civil War brought an organized application of resources to prepare, build, and equip 
mass fighting forces.  This nation’s volunteer minuteman army, which served the nation 
well in its infancy, was now defunct.   The need for standardization was rampant with no 
consolidated efforts by either side.  (“Mobilization,” n.d., p. 3) 
In 1917 the United States entered World War (WW) I without stockpiles of 
equipment or standards for producing them.  The military had little experience with 
industry and often the Army and Navy competed with each other for products, materials, 
and plant capacity.  (“Mobilization,” n.d., p. 3) 
WW II marked an unprecedented mobilization effort providing for the 
development, production, and delivery of combat systems and supplies to our troops and 
Allied forces (“Mobilization,” n.d., p. 22).  The use of military standards and 
specifications was widespread including the use of statistical quality control methods.  
The wartime mobilization needs and tight schedules necessitated the use of statistical 
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techniques to control and improve quality.  Standards for quality control can be traced 
back to the works of Frederick Taylor in 1875 who introduced the concept of dividing 
work into manageable tasks.  He developed standardized production and assembly 
methods, which resulted in productivity increases and quality improvements.  Assembly 
operations became more repeatable and less prone to errors.  Although standard methods 
generally provide for increased quality, they risk impeding innovation and continuous 
improvement, which is vital to growth.  The works of Walter A. Shewhart, Harold F. 
Dodge, and Harry G. Romig of Bell Telephone Laboratories in the first half of the 20th 
century contributed to the first statistically based sampling standards (vice 100% 
inspection) for the military during WW II and beyond.  (Montgomery, 2001, pp. 8-11)  
WW II spawned what Eisenhower coined as the “Military Industrial Complex” 
which grew as this country mobilized for WW II and prospered during the four decades 
of the Cold War (Higgs, 1995, ¶ 2).  During WW II approximately 20% of the civilian 
workforce was supporting the defense industry.  In 1999, the defense industry employed 
about 2% of the civilian workforce.   (CDI, 2002, ¶ 1) 
 
D. RISK AVOIDANCE THROUGH STANDARDS & SPECIFICATIONS 
Following WWII, this country’s military posture and doctrine was framed around 
a known Cold War adversary and threat.  We countered this threat with both conventional 
and strategic military strategies aimed at a potential European ground war and deep sea 
conflicts.  Sea-based and land based strategic weapons provided a necessary deterrent 
that led to decades of stalemate or détente.  The increasing military buildup in the 1950s 
fueled the U.S. economy, and by 1960 the defense industry accounted for more than half 
of the U.S. federal expenditures (CNN Interactive, 2002, preface).  The Military 
Industrial Complex was thriving.  It continued into the 1960s due to the space race and 
again in the 1980s as a result of the Reagan buildup.   
Our defensive build-up was achieved with an infrastructure of military standards 
and specifications.  They provided proven standards, methods, and practices for design, 
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build, and testing phases.  Risk avoidance through standards and specifications was the 
norm.   
Many believe implementing standards and specifications are costly, and savings 
could be realized by replacing them with commercial specifications.  On the contrary, 
they were not costly per se, but costly in the manner in which they were invoked.  Many 
times standards and specifications would be invoked in their entirety, instead of properly 
tailored.  This drove up the cost because the contractor had to address blanket 
requirements rather than the critical ones.  In other cases the contractor had to negotiate 
with the Government on what the real requirements were.  The use of proven standards 
and practices is a good risk avoidance technique.  However, it is not proactive, nor does it 
take advantage of the technological innovations of the commercial marketplace.   
Instead of the wholesale cancellation of military standards and specifications in 
1994, the better approach would have been to tailor existing military standard and 
specifications and supplement as necessary as innovations occurred within the defense 
and commercial sectors.  Besides, Dr. Perry’s mandate to replace military standards and 
specifications with commercial ones was accomplished many times by simply rewriting 
the document in a commercial format and keeping much of the original military content.  
This was done, not for sake of time, but because the military standards and specifications 
contained sound standards and best practices.  In other cases the military standards and 
specifications needed updating because they did not contain the latest technological 
innovations.   
In the 1960s and 1970s, DoD outspent the private sector in total Research & 
Development spending.  At the height of the space program the government (including 
NASA) spent nearly two-thirds of the overall R&D funding.  DoD R&D efforts were 
drivers for technology innovation, ingenuity, and knowledge.  Many high technology 
solutions were transformed into the commercial marketplace.  The space program 
initiated many technological advances that are now common in the private sector 
including semiconductors, biomedical equipment, and satellite systems.  Some feel that 
today’s focused investment in technologies for homeland defense may spawn additional 
dual use technologies.  (“Defense spending,” 2002,  ¶ 7). 
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 Prior to acquisition reform, a risk awareness culture of risk taking was not needed 
because defense budgets were large and could sustain the infrastructure of a sizable DoD 
supplier base, a network of specifications and standards, and investment in R&D.  The 
Cold War ended when our adversary’s military-economic infrastructure crumbled and 
signs of capitalism emerged.    With the threat gone, defense budgets were cut drastically 
in the early 1990s.  The DoD infrastructure could not be supported any longer and the 
time was right for reform.  DoD R&D funding was cut and could not keep up with the 
technological revolution of the commercial marketplace.  The demand for electronic 
components for consumer electronics, telecommunications, and automobiles essentially 
drove DoD out of the marketplace.  DoD contractor mergers resulting from defense cuts 
left us with a shrinking supplier base signaling the end of the Military Industrial 
Complex.  Even without the formal acquisition reform mandate in 1994, DoD was 
destined for a revolution in military and business affairs.  Limited defense budgets and 
market forces were driving us to this point.   
Today, it is clear that DoD relies on an integrated commercial—military industrial 
base.  However, both markets are motivated by two opposing forces.  The military is 
concerned with executing the mission while keeping our warfighters safe.  The 
commercial market is concerned with making a profit at all costs.  It is often difficult to 
integrate these two opposing forces.    
 
E. GENERAL APPROACH 
This research examines how technical risk management has evolved throughout 
the Navy and determines to what extent technical risk management methods are being 
used by program managers and other acquisition personnel.  A sample of DoN program 
managers, acquisition professionals, and industry representatives was surveyed to 
determine attitudes on technical risk management, what methods they are using, and what 
training they have received.  Members from all three Navy Systems Commands 
(SYSCOM), specifically NAVSEA, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR), and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) were surveyed.  The results 
will be used to assist Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, 
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Development and Acquisition, Acquisition and Business Management 
(ASN(RD&A)ABM) in writing future risk management policy and guidance for the 
Navy.       
 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will address the following research questions: 
 
• What is the history of technical risk management?  
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of technical risk management? 
• What are the current practices for technical risk management within DoN program 
management offices? 
• Have DoN program management offices implemented the technical risk management 
guidance of NAVSO P-3686, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk?  What 
guidance documents are they using? 
• What are program management offices’ opinions of technical risk management? 
• What are some potential solutions to minimize technical risk? 
• How does a systems engineering framework avoid or minimize technical risk? 
• How do decisions made today affect tomorrow’s products? 
• What are other sources of technical risk management best practices, lessons learned, 
and metrics? 
• What are some sources for technical risk management methods & techniques and 
what do they teach? 
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis in organized into four chapters.  Chapter I provides an introduction to 
acquisition reform and describes its relationship to a risk awareness culture change within 
the acquisition community.  It also discusses the origin and evolution of risk avoidance 
methods prior to acquisition reform.  Chapter II defines technical risk management and 
describes methods & techniques currently used within the Navy.  Chapter III describes 
the research methodology and the survey tool used to solicit opinions and information 
from program managers, their staff, and other acquisition professionals.  It also provides 
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the survey results and analyzes the results for significant trends.  Chapter IV provides a 
summary of the research with conclusions.   
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II. TECHNICAL RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS 
A. THE ORIGIN OF TECHNICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
During the middle of the Cold War era the space race was a welcomed 
preoccupation of both political & military leaders and the public at large.  From the 
moment that Sputnik I was launched on October 4, 1957, this country was determined not 
to let our Cold War adversary gain supremacy of space.  The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) was formed on 1 October 1958 as a result of the “Sputnik 
crisis of confidence” and immediately began working on human space flight (“NASA 
history,” 2002, ¶ 1).  NASA’s mission was expedited when President Kennedy uttered 
the following words to a joint session of Congress on May 25, 1961: “I believe that this 
nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a 
man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.” (JFK Library, 2002, chap. IX, ¶ 
5) 
The very success of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo manned space flight 
programs can be attributed to process discipline and rigor implemented through a 
regimen of strict standards and specifications and contractor oversight.  The oversight 
consisted of many checks and balances and layer upon layer of inspections according to 
Douglas Patterson, former ASN(RD&A) Technical Director, who was involved in the 
Apollo program (D. Patterson, personal communication, August 8, 2002).  NASA was 
risk averse and managed risk by trying to avoid it altogether with high reliability and 
redundant systems.  Those systems, subsystems, and components that could not achieve 
high reliability were classified as High-risk items and risk mitigation actions were taken.  
Let’s examine this risk avoidance culture in more detail and discuss how a catastrophic 
event caused this agency to rethink how they practiced risk management. 
Historically, NASA practiced risk avoidance, relying on strict oversight, 
manufacturing and assembly process controls, use of design safety factors, and criticality 
analyses (e.g., a failure of a “criticality one” component could lead to loss of vehicle and 
the crew).  This was particularly the case until the Challenger disaster.  Why?  In the 
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early 1960s various mathematicians and consultants using Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) techniques calculated that there would be a very small probability of success of 
reaching the moon.  NASA feared these results would frighten the public and adversely 
impact congressional funding for the program.  As a result, NASA banned the use of 
PRA methods and turned their focus on risk avoidance.   
Willis J. Willoughby, Jr., Director of Product Integrity for the Apollo Program 
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (RM&QA), was responsible for 
Apollo’s reliability record.  He was instrumental in institutionalizing a focus on 
engineering fundamentals and discipline within NASA, creating a risk avoidance and risk 
abatement management style, which was further strengthened after the 1967 Apollo I 
disaster.  After a brilliant career with NASA, Mr. Willoughby came to the Navy bringing 
with him the concepts he developed for NASA.  NASA continued down the path of risk 
avoidance from the end of Apollo, to the Explorer program and the start of the earth 
orbiter shuttle program.  Somewhere along the way in the 1970s NASA management 
style began to change, and they lost the recipe for accountability, critical management 
level checks and balances, and process rigor.  Then came the Challenger accident and a 
wake-up call for NASA.  As a result, a realistic assessment of risk was needed on the 
space shuttle program.  Although the failure mechanism was a solid rocket booster O-
ring, there were a number of underlying causes associated with the lack of discipline and 
process rigor.  Management failures including poor communication, schedule pressures, 
political pressures, and incentives to launch foretold an inevitable hardware failure.  This 
is an example where process risk leads to product risk.  NASA realized a more proactive 
method was needed to assess risk.   
By this time PRA methods were commonplace in the Nuclear Power Industry, so 
NASA took another look at these proven methods used in mission/safety critical 
applications.  In the days of Apollo, probabilistic assessment methods were not 
completely avoided.  According to Mr. Patterson, these methods were used selectively for 
special studies, critical items, and single points of failure.  Because NASA depends 
heavily on public relations to keep the funding lines flowing, the agency has been willing 
to take a little more risk.  Cornell and Fischbeck state, “Soon after the shuttle’s 
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introduction, the agency shifted from a conservative attitude of ‘launch if proven safe’ to 
an attitude of ‘launch unless proven unsafe’.”  (Pate-Cornell & Fischbeck, 1994, p. 75)  
The managers generally shared this optimism more than the engineers and scientists 
working directly with the systems (Pate-Cornell & Fischbeck, 1994).             
DoD practiced similar risk avoidance techniques as NASA prior to 1985.  Like 
NASA, DoD used their network of military specifications and standards to avoid risk 
through the application of proven (and Low risk) standards and practices.  DoD and DoN 
policy lacked risk management requirements, and there was little guidance for program 
managers.  Technical performance measures and reactive, problem solving methods were 
used to control risk.  “Historically, Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of the 
Navy (DoN) Program Managers have used cost, schedule, and performance parameters to 
exercise control over and measure the success of their programs.”  (ASN(RD&A)ABM, 
1997, p. 1)   These were mainly reactive methods.  It took a cultural change initiated by 
Willis J. Willoughby, Jr. in 1985 and further influenced by acquisition reform in the 
1990s to instill the importance of early identification of technical risk.   
A survey of Acquisition Category (ACAT) I through IV program managers in 
1997 by ASN(RD&A)ABM found an increasing awareness of technical/performance risk 
as the driver for cost, schedule, and performance outcomes on an acquisition program.  
This survey also found more proactive risk management efforts taking place within the 
acquisition community, as well as greater emphasis in policy documents, such as DoD 
and DoN 5000 series.  Guidance documents were also becoming available from DoD and 
DoN and also available in the Defense Acquisition Deskbook.  The results of the survey 
included the following observations: 
 
• 50% of the programs surveyed did not have risk management plans 
• Few programs offered risk management training 
• While all ACAT I programs surveyed contained a contractual requirement 
for risk management, few ACAT II, III, or IV programs had such a 
requirement 
• None of the programs surveyed used award fee scoring criteria to 
incorporate risk management 
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• Only three programs (all ACAT I) use independent risk assessment teams 
((ASN(RD&A)ABM, 1997, p. 1) 
 
A defining moment in the history of the Navy’s application of risk management 
methods occurred when RADM Isaac Kidd stole Mr. Willoughby from NASA in 1973 
bringing him to the Navy as Deputy Chief of Navy Material.  (“Willis Willoughby,” 
1998, ¶ 3)   Mr. Willoughby brought with him the concepts he developed while working 
for the Apollo program in the Office of Manned Space Flight during its heyday.  Mr. 
Willoughby made significant contributions to the Apollo program.  NASA’s collection of 
history (“Preparation for flight,” 1967, March 14) recalls Mr. Willoughby’s appointment 
to a special review team chartered to audit the quality control and inspection practices of 
Apollo spacecraft operations at both government and contractor activities.  This special 
audit team was formed as a result of the 1967 Apollo I fire and accident investigation that 
killed astronauts Gus Grissom, Roger Chaffee, and Edward White (“NASA historical 
reference collection,” 2002, ¶ 2).  Mr. Willoughby was also instrumental in bringing 
Apollo 13 back to earth safely.  (“Willis Willoughby,” 1998, ¶ 3)    
Mr. Willoughby brought a culture change to the Navy.  His philosophy was based 
on an adherence to engineering fundamentals and discipline.  He believed in designing 
reliability into the product instead of inspecting it in.  He brought to the Navy improved 
weapon and combat system reliability, readiness, improved production quality, and 
minimum life cycle cost.  He preached early identification of technical risk so it can be 
mitigated rather than taking a wait and see what happens approach.  He believed 
technical risk is the driver behind all other risk, so it must be addressed early in the 
acquisition life cycle.   
It is interesting how the only two tragedies in the history of manned space flight 
resulted in a greater emphasis on risk analysis and management.  The 1967 disaster had 
an indirect impact on the Navy’s application of engineering discipline and process rigor 
as a result of Mr. Willoughby’s experience and lessons learned from his NASA tour.  The 
Challenger disaster in 1986 forced NASA to supplement its risk avoidance approach 
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through standards and specifications with more proactive probabilistic methods.  
Although on the right path, the Navy has not reached a similar point of integration.   
 
B. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Risk management is a process.  As with any process, it can be flow charted to 
provide a graphical depiction of the relationships and interfaces between the major 
components.  Risk management can be conducted using different approaches.  Regardless 
of the risk management strategy taken, a basic foundation or framework exists.  Figure 2 
illustrates the key components of the risk management process.  This framework applies 
to any risk management approach. 
 
1. Risk Areas 
Typically, risk is categorized as technical or non-technical risk.  Technical risk 
can be further broken down into process and product risk.  Process risk is directly 
associated with the critical engineering processes and disciplines used to design, test, and 
fabricate a product.  A product is defined as a hardware or software item.  A product risk 
is hardware, software, and technology specific and relates to the performance of the 
product itself as opposed to the process used to create the product.  Technology risks 
associated with leading edge products or technologies yet to be proven are also grouped 
under the product risk area unless the technological challenge is an engineering or 
manufacturing process.  Often, technical risk drives cost, schedule, and performance risk, 
and this is the reason why technical risk should be addressed first and early in the 
acquisition life cycle.  Non-technical risk is the category reserved for contracting, 
program management, and programmatic related risk events.  Note, occasionally a risk 
event may fit the definition of multiple risk areas.  When this occurs the assessor should 
assign the risk event to the most appropriate category with assistance from the IPT lead 
























Figure 2. Risk Management Process. From (SURTASS, 2002, p. 10) 
 
2. Program Objectives 
The most common program objectives the program manager is concerned with 
are cost, schedule, and performance parameters.  This triad is often referred to as the 
“Iron Triangle” of project management as shown in Figure 3 (American Graduate 
University, 1998).  It is important to note that cost, schedule, and performance are not 
mutually exclusive, but interrelated.  If one is affected, the others will also be affected.  
Think of the triad as a triangle made from a rubber band.  At each point is one of these 
parameters.  Think of each parameter pulling against the other, so the triangle is a 
continuously undulating shape.   Throughout the acquisition cycle, the program manager 
is continuously conducting trade-offs between these three parameters in order to arrive at 
a proper balance among them.  Historically, the success of a program manager was 
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measured based on cost and schedule performance, with performance often traded off to 
improve cost and schedule.   
Today, with the increased focus on systems engineering, a balanced solution 
among cost, schedule, performance, and risk is the objective.  The three program 
objectives depicted in Figure 3 may also be supplemented as needed.  Some programs 
have elevated environmental, safety, and security parameters to the program objectives 






Figure 3. The Iron Triangle of Project Management. From (Amer. Graduate Univ., 1998) 
 
3. Risk Assessment 
The term risk assessment is often used interchangeably with risk analysis.  
However, the most common interpretation is that risk assessment consists of two 
components:  risk identification and risk analysis.  Risk identification is the act of 
identifying risk within risk areas.  It involves documenting the risk appropriately.  Risk 
analysis follows risk identification and is the process of classifying the risk.   
Classification consists of assigning a risk level (e.g., Low, Moderate, High) to the risk 
using any number of classification techniques available, some which will be discussed 
later.  Risk levels are assigned in order to prioritize handling.  In an ideal world, risk 
mitigation actions are taken on all identified risks.  In today’s environment of limited 
resources, usually only the High and Moderate risks are mitigated.           
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4. Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation, also known as risk handling, is the process of identifying, 
analyzing potential options, selecting, and implementing risk mitigation solutions for the 
identified risk.  Mitigation is defined as reducing a risk to an acceptable level.  It does not 
necessarily mean eliminating the risk, that would be the ideal world once again.  Risk 
mitigation planning is conducted and a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) is 
documented for the selected approach.  Generally, the risk level and the POA&M is 
documented on the same risk form with the risk description and in many cases part of a 
risk management database.  A risk mitigation POA&M should be loaded into the 
program’s integrated master schedule and Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) to assure 
resources are planned and loaded for risk mitigation activities.     
              
5. Risk Tracking 
Risk tracking is the process of monitoring the risk mitigation progress of the 
POA&M.  As part of this process, the effectiveness of risk handling efforts is assessed to 
a collection of performance measures.  Risk tracking requires periodic risk assessment 
follow-up and a relook at lower level risks not part of the initial risk mitigation planning 
effort.  Low risks can escalate, so a periodic reassessment of Low risks is warranted.  
Participation in risk review boards is an excellent way to stay informed as part of the risk 
tracking/monitoring effort.      
 
6. Information Feedback 
The success of the risk management process relies on information feedback 
throughout the process.  Feedback of risk mitigation efforts to the beginning of the risk 
management process flow allow us to iteratively reassess and adjust the risk level as 
mitigation actions are taken (or not taken).  Feedback to the risk area element may cause 
another risk of a different category to be formed.  We know that process risk leads to 




Throughout the entire risk management process properly documenting the risk 
event is critical.  Documentation includes recording risks and associated risk mitigation 
plans, as well as reporting risk status to management.  As a minimum, the following 
fields are recommended to properly record a risk:  1) risk tracking number, 2) risk title, 3) 
risk description, 4) risk level, 5) rationale for risk level, 6) risk mitigation PO&AM for 
Moderate and High risks, 7) risk mitigation actions completed, and 8) risk owner.  The 
documentation should include all supporting documentation associated with the risk and 
mitigation plans and results.  Many programs use electronic risk databases to capture this 
information.  Databases allow for easy tracking and reporting of risk status.  Some 
smaller programs still use manual risk identification forms.  A key output of the 
documentation process is the reporting of risk status and results to management.   
 
C. RISK IS EVERYWHERE 
There is risk in every program.  This is a fact that program managers must accept.  
It is impossible to avoid risk in the complex process of weapon system development, 
modification, or procurement.  The complexities of hardware and advanced software 
products lead to program risk.  Risk is inherent in the development process, the 
modification or upgrade of existing products, and the use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS)/Non-developmental Items (NDI).  Because risk is so prevalent in everything we 
do, the key to success is the early identification of risk so mitigation actions can be taken 
to reduce the risk to acceptable levels.  “Risk that is known, monitored, and adequately 
mitigated seldom interferes with successful product development.”  (“Methods & 
Metrics,” 1994, p. 3)   
 
D. THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNICAL RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS 
IN THE NAVY 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s many of our aircraft and ship systems were 
unreliable and not maintainable.  For instance, the Navy was ready to proceed with full 
 25
development of the F/A-18 Hornet in the late 1970s.  However, initial reports from the 
Fleet indicated that the aircraft required servicing after only 30 to 45 minutes in the air.  
Mr. Willoughby, while Deputy Chief of Navy Material Command for Reliability, 
Maintainability & Quality Assurance, insisted that all F/A-18 contracts include 
provisions for reliability and maintainability instead of just flight performance.  As a 
result, the F/A-18 entered Initial Operating Capability (IOC) with greater reliability than 
many mature systems and took less than half as many maintenance man-hours as other 
aircraft.  In the first operational deployment the aircraft would end a day of flying still 
able to fly while the F-14s and A-6s were already in for service.   In addition, the F/A-18 
engine could be changed in 20 minutes.  As a comparison, the A-4 Skyhawk flown in 
Vietnam required its tail to be removed before an engine could be changed.  (Clark & 
Johnson, 2002, ¶ 1-4) 
In 1981, the MK 92 fire control system was experiencing performance problems 
in the Fleet, so an aggressive program to improve its performance and reliability in clutter 
and electronic counter-measure environments was launched.  MK 92 provides FFG 7 
class frigates and other surface combatants with a weapons control system for use against 
air and surface targets (Military Analysis Network, 2002a, ¶ 1-2).   
The MK-15 Phalanx Close In Weapon System (CIWS) was another system that 
had low operational availability.  MK 15 is a fast-reaction, rapid-fire 20-millimeter gun 
system that provides U.S. Navy and Allied ships with a final, short-range defense against 
anti-ship missiles and fixed wing aircraft that have penetrated other Fleet defenses.  
(Military Analysis Network, 2002b, ¶ 1)  This system was rushed to the Fleet to provide 
close in anti ship cruise missile defense as a result of the sinking of Britain’s HMS 
Sheffield by Argentinean air attacks from fighter planes using Exocet air to surface 
missiles in the Falklands War (“Chronicle of the Falklands,” n.d., May 4).  CIWS has 
been deployed on nearly every class of ship since the early 1980s.        
There were many other troubled systems with poor performance and reliability 
problems, as well as high maintenance burdens in the early 1980s.  As the complexity of 
weapons and combat systems grew, some soothsayers believed the reliability of systems 
would be impacted negatively, blaming the complexity for poor readiness. 
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In 1985 a Defense Science Board (DSB) Study, chaired by Mr. Willoughby, 
deliberated the issue of complexity versus readiness and found little evidence that 
increasing complexity of new DoD weapon systems was the result of recent trends in 
poor readiness.  Rather, the probable cause was inadequate engineering and 
manufacturing disciplines during the design, development, and production of the system.    
The DSB was comprised of government and industry members.  The team postulated that 
once rigorous and disciplined engineering practices were employed and institutionalized, 
the risk of deploying unsuitable weapon systems would be Low and the time in the 
acquisition cycle would be reduced.  It is interesting to note that back in 1985 DoD 
realized the acquisition cycle times were too long and desired methods to shorten these 
cycles.  This is the same challenge we are facing today.  In 1985, the solution was more 
rigorous engineering discipline and processes during the development phases prior to a 
Milestone III production decision.  (DoD 4245.7-M, 1985, pp. 1-8)    
Given the number of acquisition programs with poor reliability, burdensome 
maintenance, and supportability issues a DSB Task Force was formed under the auspices 
of the DSB to develop a set of disciplines and controls for application during design, test, 
and production activities.  The government and industry representatives on the Task 
Force came up with a list of templates that acquisition programs could follow to 
minimize program risk.  These templates were nothing more than critical engineering 
disciplines and processes for use in describing Low risk programs.  They are also key 
components of the systems engineering process.  This collection of templates was 
published in September of 1985 as DoD 4245.7-M, Transition From Development To 
Production…Solving the Risk Equation, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition & Logistics.  They soon became known as the “Willoughby Templates,” 
after Mr. Willoughby, DSB Task Force Chairman.  Figure 4 provides a high level look at 
the Templates, which have been supplemented by the Best Manufacturing Practices 
Center of Excellence (BMPCOE) since their initial release.  The shaded templates depict 












































































































































































Figure 4. Willoughby Templates. After (DoD 4245.7-M, 1985, p. 8) 
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Because of Mr. Willoughby’s many contributions in this field, he is considered 
the father of reliability for his ruthless advocacy of product integrity disciplines 
throughout his career (“Willis Willoughby,” 1998, ¶ 1).  Mr. Willoughby’s release of 
DoD 4245.7-M to the acquisition community marked the beginning of technical risk 
management within DoD and the Navy.  He also drafted a number of acquisition 
standards and guidance that have improved Fleet readiness and reduced life cycle costs.  
He was responsible for the creation of many innovative acquisition management products 
and tools, including the Best Manufacturing Practices (BMP) program and the Program 
Manager’s Workstation.  The BMP program is a knowledge repository of industry and 
government best engineering practices which is available free of charge to both 
government and industry in order to promote sharing of best practices.  Program 
Manager’s Workstation (PMWS) is an electronic suite of software tools designed to 
provide acquisition know-how, best industry practices, and a templates-based technical 
risk management software program for use by acquisition professionals.  Together these 
tools provide a comprehensive knowledge information, measurement, and risk 
management system based on critical engineering processes and best practices through all 
phases of the product development life cycle.  For these reasons, this author will always 
considered Mr. Willoughby the father of technical risk management.     
In 1998 Willis J. Willoughby, Jr. was inducted into the Navy Acquisition Hall of 
Fame as an Acquisition Pioneer.  The Navy Acquisition Pioneer program was established 
in 1997 by ASN(RD&A), John Douglass, to recognize the achievements of past, present, 
and future acquisition leaders in the Navy and Marine Corp (“Willis Willoughby,” 1998, 
¶ 1).  He was nominated by both NAVAIR and NAVSEA for a lifetime of achievement 
and ruthless application of product integrity disciplines to many Navy and Marine Corps 
systems.  Some of the greatest operational successes during the Gulf War, such as the 
F/A-18 Hornet, Tomahawk and HARM missiles, were the result of Mr. Willoughby’s 
attention to engineering discipline and process rigor (Dalton, 1998, p.2).  The Honorable 
John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, presented the award to Mr. Willoughby and 
remarked, “it is no secret he built quality and engineering competence into every program 
he touched…programs like the S-3A, CH-53B, Harpoon, SPS-49, the AEGIS system and 
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many more.”  (Dalton, 1998, p.2)  Mr. Willoughby’s son, Brian, is following in his 
father’s footsteps and carrying on the product integrity tradition since his father’s death in 
1999.  In regards to his father’s work, Brian Willoughby stated, “He started out in the 
RM&QA business, what he did never really changed, it is just called technical risk 
management today.”  (Brian Willoughby, personal communication, August 12, 2002) 
Although managing risk for all aspects of a program is critical, technical risk is 
the most important area of risk management because technical risk is the driver behind all 
other program risks including cost, schedule, and performance risks.  Technical risk 
management assesses the implementation of critical engineering processes and 
disciplines up front and early during the acquisition life cycle.  These disciplines are also 
characterized as engineering fundamentals.  If these critical engineering disciplines are 
not implemented, then there is risk that products (hardware/software) will be adversely 
impacted.  This relationship between Process and Product is characterized by the 
following statement:  Unmitigated Process risk leads to Product risk.  Both government 
and industry experiences have proven that basic disciplined design, test, and production 
practices are critical for Low risk acquisitions.  Program risks are often the result of poor 
management decisions regarding the application of engineering fundamentals.  Therefore, 
technical risk management also focuses on sound management decisions based on the 
assessment of risk.   
Risk assessment techniques, a subset of risk management, were first used to 
measure how well an acquisition program had implemented critical engineering 
disciplines.  Critical processes are interrelated and interdependent which means a failure 
to do well in one area may adversely impact other areas.   
Unfortunately, technical risk management and the importance of controlling 
critical technical processes have generally not been well understood within the DoD 
acquisition community.  The acquisition process has traditionally focused on cost and 
schedule issues, i.e., on time and within budget, instead of performance in-service.  “Its 
milestone decision points are unrelated to the industrial processes and the transition 
between development and production in the factory.”  (NAVSO P-6071, 1986, p. 5)  As a 
result, much of the DoD and DoN policy and guidance on risk management has taken a 
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technical risk management approach.   (NAVSO P-3686, 1998, pp. vii, 19)  Program 
managers and other acquisition personnel must understand the technical and industrial 
processes involved in the acquisition process in terms of best practices and lessons 
learned.  (NAVSO P-6071, 1986, p. 7) 
The critical engineering disciplines required for Low risk programs, such as those 
described in DoD 4245.7-M, are quite valid in today’s acquisition environment.  These 
disciplines are key systems engineering disciplines, and the systems engineer or architect 
should have direct responsibility to ensure these critical disciplines are implemented in 
new acquisitions.  Systems undergoing major modifications, upgrades, and 
reprocurements should also apply systems engineering disciplines.  Today, we are 
fighting the same battle of trying to shorten the acquisition cycle.  We are challenged by 
trying to support legacy systems and life extension initiatives for programs beyond their 
original design life.  The prevalent use of COTS and associated short technology refresh 
cycles has led to Diminished Manufacturing Sources & Material Shortages (DMSMS).  
The short commercial product development cycle is not in sync with DoD’s long 
acquisition cycles.  Despite nearly 10 years of acquisition reform, acquisition cycles are 
still too long.  Achieving interoperability between U.S., Allied, and coalition systems is a 
key objective of the latest DoD 5000 series documentation.  In order to achieve this 
interoperability, there has been an increased emphasis on systems engineering and 
associated disciplines.  Systems engineering includes the same critical engineering 
disciplines mentioned in the 1985 templates.   
Risk assessment is still used to measure how well programs are doing with the 
implementation of systems engineering disciplines.  What have improved over the course 
of 17 years are risk awareness and the integration of risk management into the program 
manager’s tool kit.  It is a management discipline now, not just an assessment tool.  In 
addition, the risk management approach is more proactive where the previous technical 
risk assessment efforts were somewhat reactive due to the emphasis on the transition to 
production phase.  Often program managers and other acquisition personnel used the 
Willoughby Templates to conduct a risk assessment just prior to a Milestone (MS) III 
Production decision.  The risk assessment was usually done as part of the Production 
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Readiness Review (PRR).  Later, this practice was modified by some program managers 
to an incremental risk assessment process throughout Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD).  It was typically implemented through the use of incremental PRRs 
with a final wrap-up PRR a few months before the MS III Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB) or equivalent meeting.  This evolution from risk assessment to risk management 
occurred to inject a more proactive approach to risk identification and mitigation.  Risk 
assessments conducted just prior to MS III during the transition to production phase were 
purely reactive and much too late in the acquisition life cycle to affect cost effective 
change.   
This improvement was the direct result of acquisition reform back in 1994.  With 
the elimination of military specifications and standards, program managers no longer had 
a risk avoidance method.  With the use of commercial specifications and contractor 
internal processes, program managers lost insight into their acquisition programs 
including much of the engineering process rigor.   Program managers were forced to 
supplement their tool kit with a method to gather insight and proactively mitigate 
potential risks.     
There has also been a policy shift over the last 17 years with an increased 
emphasis on risk management in the DoD 5000 series acquisition program policy 
documentation, facilitated by acquisition reform initiatives.  If it were not for acquisition 
reform policy, we might never have seen such an increased focus on risk management.   
Today, risk assessment is a key component of an acquisition program’s overall 
risk management program.  Risk assessments are conducted as early as possible and are 
applied continuously throughout the acquisition life cycle on successful programs. 
 
1. Technical Risk Management Guidance 
The following paragraphs will highlight some of the best guidance documents and 
tools for technical risk management.  The Navy leads the other Services in setting the 
standard for technical risk management methods development and the publication of 
guidance to educate its workforce.  Although the following documents and tools were for 
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the most part created by Navy acquisition professionals in partnership with selected 
industry representatives, the resultant products are applicable to the entire DoD 
acquisition community.    
a. DoD 4245.7-M 
DoD 4245.7-M, a.k.a. the Willoughby Templates, contains a collection of 
48 templates.  Each template describes an area of risk inherent in the design, test, and 
productions processes and then specifies technical methods for reducing that risk.  
Additional templates address other critical areas since program risk is also associated 
with funding, facilities, management issues, and the transition plan for the production 
phase.  The entire network of Templates is arranged in a logical sequence as seen from a 
program manager’s viewpoint.  Funding is presented first because it influences every 
other template in the document.  (DoD 4245.7-M, 1985, p. 5) 
Despite its age, DoD 4245.7-M is timeless.  Today, this document can be 
found in the Defense Acquisition Deskbook, as well as on many acquisition related web-
sites.  These templates are used by the Best Manufacturing Practices (BMP) Program to 
conduct BMP surveys of government and industry facilities/contractors.  This collection 
of 66 templates is dynamic and continues to be supplemented as best practices and 
lessons learned are discovered which further reduce the technical risk of military and 
commercial product development and production. 
This document is often used as a guideline by risk assessment teams to 
evaluate how well a contractor or government activity has implemented critical 
engineering (best practice) disciplines.  It is the original technical risk assessment guiding 
document and remains invaluable.  The 48 original templates have served as a foundation 
for technical risk on which additional critical engineering disciplines have been built.     
b. NAVSO P-6071 Best Practices Manual 
Released in March of 1986 as a Navy guidance document,  
NAVSO P-6071, Best Practices – How to Avoid Surprises in the World’s Most 
Complicated Technical Process, was a follow-on to the Willoughby Templates.  Mr. 
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Willoughby acting as Chairman, Defense Science Board Task Force, Transition from 
Development to Production, was responsible for the publication of this guidance manual.  
This manual was written as a working tool in a user friendly, easy to read format.  This 
manual, as well as DoD 4245.7-M, was conceived by a joint government/industry team.  
It contains best practices and industrial processes used within government and industry.  
For each DoD 4245.7-M template area, the manual contains a collection of checklists, 
traps, and pitfalls.  It illustrates common mistakes that past and current defense programs 
have made which have led or will lead to technical risk.  It contains a chart, which 
compares the consequences of current approaches vice the best practice approach.  For 
purposes of this thesis, a best practice is defined as a critical engineering discipline that 
must be in place for a Low risk program.  Finally, the manual contains a checklist to aid 
the acquisition professional in implementing a best practice approach and provides a list 
of assessment questions that a reviewing authority would ask when evaluating whether or 
not the best practice has been implemented.  You may ask, what is “the World’s Most 
Complicated Technical Process?”  Why it is weapon system design, test, and production!  
(NAVSO P-6071, 1986, pp. 2, 5, 11)     
c. Methods & Metrics for Product Success 
 In July of 1994 in the middle of the year of reformation and Dr. Perry’s 
mandate for acquisition reform, ASN(RD&A) released a guidance document for 
technical risk management called Methods & Metrics for Product Success.  Once again, 
Mr. Willoughby had a hand in additional technical risk management guidance performing 
as lead editor for this document in his position as ASN(RD&A) Deputy for Product 
Integrity.  This document established a methodology and process flow for conducting a 
technical risk assessment, which will be discussed later.  It also provided Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOE) or metrics for the design, test, and production templates contained 
in DoD 4245.7-M and NAVSO P-6071.  (“Methods & Metrics,” 1994, pp. iii-iv)  Thus, 
Navy technical risk management guidance continued to build on the nearly 10 year old 
Willoughby Templates.  Methods & Metrics relied on an approach for technical risk 
management discussed specifically in Dr. Perry’s 10 tenets for IPPD.  The 10th IPPD 
tenet states, 
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Proactive Identification and Management of Risk - Critical 
cost, schedule and technical parameters related to system 
characteristics should be identified from risk analyses and user 
requirements. Technical and business performance measurement 
plans, with appropriate metrics, should be developed and compared 
to best-in-class industry benchmarks to provide continuing 
verification of the degree of anticipated and actual achievement of 
technical and business parameters.  (“IPPD definitions,” 1995, ¶ 2)   
 
As evident by this quote, Dr. Perry is advocating that technical processes 
with associated metrics be established and compared to industry benchmarks (i.e., best 
practices).  This is exactly the approach Methods & Metrics takes by developing a set of 
metrics called MOEs for the critical template areas already well established in previous 
guidance.  The objective is to provide some measurable risk assessment criteria to a 
traditionally subjective process.  “Product success depends upon using proven technical 
management methods along with established technical metrics during the entire 
development effort.”  (“Methods & Metrics,” 1994, p. 3)  A risk assessment conducted to 
the guidance of the Willoughby Templates was based on the subjective assessment of the 
amount of variance between the current approach and best practice.  The amount of 
variance was classified as Low, Moderate, or High.  These ratings were based on a 
subjective assessment by knowledgeable subject matter experts.  Methods & Metrics 
provided additional benefits associated with its methodology to the acquisition 
professional including:  1) communication of program status to management, 2) feedback 
of measurable results to team leaders concerning the application of key disciplines, 3) a 
method to assess and measure subcontractor and vendor performance, and 4) support for 
systems engineering, concurrent engineering, and IPPD initiatives.  (“Methods & 
Metrics,” 1994, p. iv) 
d. Program Manager’s Workstation (PMWS) 
The Program Manager’s WorkStation (PMWS) is an electronic knowledge 
information system, which is comprised of a suite of tools designed to assist the 
acquisition professional.  It consists of three tools, namely the KnowHow Database, the 
Technical Risk Identification and Mitigation System (TRIMS), and the BMP Database.   
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These tools complement each other and provide a comprehensive acquisition and 
technical risk management knowledge information system “providing users with the 
knowledge, insight, and experience to make informed decisions through all phases of 
product development, production, and beyond.” (BMP, n.d., overview).  PMWS is 
available to government, industry, and academia for no charge via BMPCOE’s Web Site 
at http://www.bmpcoe.org.  The tools can be run on-line, downloaded to a local hard 
drive, or ordered on a CD. 
The KnowHow database provides an excellent repository of acquisition 
knowledge and guidance documents.  It is an electronic library of technical handbooks, 
guidelines, and publications, which span a number of acquisition and engineering topics.  
For example, a quick search of the KnowHow database on key words “value 
engineering” would result in a number of guidance documents on how to create a value 
engineering program.  (BMP, n.d., knowhow) 
The BMP Database contains over 2,500 best practices that have been 
verified and documented by an independent team of experts during BMP surveys of 
government and industry activities.  Each best practice entry in the database provides 
basic background, process descriptions, metrics, and lessons learned, and a point of 
contact for further information.  (BMP, n.d., BMP database)  The best practices identified 
in this database provide a critical component of the qualitative technical risk assessment 
process.  In order to determine if a risk exists on a program, the qualitative risk 
assessment process requires a comparison between current program practice and best 
practice.  The amount of variance determines the risk level.  Thus, BMP is an excellent 
(free) source of best practices information.  
TRIMS is an automated technical risk assessment and management tool 
that allows the user to identify, quantify, track, and report program technical risks and 
risk mitigation activities.  TRIMs applies to all phases of the acquisition life-cycle.  
Originally conceived by Mr. Willoughby as a way to automate the assessment criteria of 
his templates, it has grown to include the assessment questions from NAVSO P-6071, the 
measures of effectiveness from Methods & Metrics for Product Success, and criteria from 
the Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Software Risk Engineering 
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(SRE) Model.  The TRIMS tool utilizes a framework based on the original Willoughby 
Templates plus the new template areas added by the BMP program.  (Note:  TRIMS 
presently provides several knowledge bases for use in risk assessments.  The Systems 
Engineering knowledge base is the broadest and most widely used which is based on the 
Willoughby Templates.  There is also a Software Design knowledge base for use by 
software-intensive programs and an Interoperability knowledge base.)  Each template 
area has a number of assessment questions associated with it requiring a Yes or No 
answer.  It asks the minimum number of questions, typically 5-10, needed to assess 
technical risk and promote dialog among program team members.  TRIMS allows the 
user to create a POA&M for each question if the activity is deficient (i.e., risky) in that 
area.  TRIMS includes over 500 assessment questions which continues to grow as lessons 
learned are added to the database.  An abbreviated sample of assessment questions is 
shown in Figure 5 for two template areas.   
Many users tailor the TRIMS tool prior to using.  Template categories, 
template areas, and assessment questions can be tailored.  This is highly recommended as 
not all template areas apply to every program and the current phase.  Unique template 
areas and assessment questions can be added by the user to more closely align the tool 
with specific aspects of the program/product.   
TRIMS provides links within the tool to the KnowHow and BMP 
databases.  Thus, the user can search these associated databases for best practices for a 
particular area.  TRIMS, along with the other two components of the PMWS, has also 
been incorporated into the Defense Acquisition Deskbook.  The use of PMWS was taught 
to all attendees of the 14 week Advanced Program Management Course at DSMC until 
2002 when the curriculum was changed.  PMWS is now taught in the DAU Advanced 








































































































































ORIGINAL DOD 4245.7-M TEMPLATE
1. Does the contractor's corporate policy 
include producibility as part of design reviews?
2. Are manufacturing and producibility
personnel involved in the design process? 
3. Are proof of manufacturing models required 
prior to production? 
4. Are design and manufacturing engineers 
collocated during development? 
5. Are Production Readiness Reviews (PRRs) 
planned incrementally? 
6. Have all parameter interrelationships been 
defined and distributed to the entire design 
team so changes can be coordinated? 
7. Has the effect of design on current 
manufacturing processes and facilities been 
assessed? 
8. Are < 2 of these used: custom gate arrays, 
PCBs with hole aspect ratio > 8, SMT with 
<=15-20 mils part spacing, High Freq \Volt 
switching PS, high power Radio Freq amps, 
stamp outs with tolerances <=1 mil, custom 
analog chips, layered flex PCBs? 
1. Have configuration control 
procedures been tailored to product 
complexity?
2. Does the status accounting system 
allow for information feedback from 
the field? 
3. Have functional and physical 
configuration audits been conducted? 
4. Has a quality assurance change 
verification system been established? 
5. Does a single organization have 
responsibility and authority over 
Configuration Management (CM)? 
6. Is the ECP process part of the CM 
process? 
7. Do fewer than 10% of total drawings 
have discrepancies? 
8. Are the development and 
maintenance of manuals electronically 
linked to the CM database to ensure 
training and technical manuals match 
the fielded configuration? 
11. Does a software library exist 
utilizing electronic tools to check out 
modules and track their status and 
relationship to other modules (inputs, 
outputs, etc.)? 
10. Are all change requests reviewed 
within 10 days? 
9. Are all deviations resolved within 
120 days? 
 
Figure 5. Sample of TRIMS Assessment Questions. From (SURTASS, 2002, p. 15) 
 
e. Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk 
In October 1998, ASN(RD&A)ABM published their most comprehensive 
technical risk management guidance document to date.  NAVO P-3686, Top Eleven 
Ways to Manage Technical Risk, was created to provide the acquisition professional a 
single source of implementation guidance and baseline information for establishing 
technical risk management functions.  This document contains standardized definitions, 
recommended methods, contractual language, training sources, critical technical 
processes/engineering fundamentals, best practices, software measures, and “Watch Out 
Fors.”  Although written for Navy program managers, it is also used by the other Services 
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and contractor program managers.  NAVSO P-3686 was the first guidance document to 
capture many of the significant changes in the risk culture resulting from acquisition 
reform.  It also sought to baseline some of these new methods and provide some 
standardization across the Navy community.  Recall, ASN(RD&A)ABM’s Risk 
Management Survey in 1997 revealed little consistency with risk management methods 
used by Navy program offices.  There were a wide variety of risk management methods 
in place.  The Survey results contained within this thesis indicate that NAVSO P-3686 is 
not quite as well known throughout the Navy community as the Willoughby Templates.  
Nearly 4 years after its release, a little over a third of the acquisition professionals 
surveyed are using this document to baseline their technical risk management programs.    
NAVSO P-3686 presents three primary approaches to technical risk 
management and selects one recommended approach.  These were the three most 
common approaches used within the Navy by acquisition programs as determined by the 
ASN(RD&A)ABM survey.  Table 3 is extracted from NAVSO P-3686 and illustrates a 
comparison of the approaches with the recommended approach highlighted.  The first 
approach is called the Process approach which is simply a Templates or best practices 
approach.  The second approach is the Product approach, which assesses risk associated 
with systems, subsystems, and components defined by the WBS.  The third and 
recommended approach is a combination of both the Product and Process approaches.  It 
is called the Integrated Process/Product approach, which is consistent with the Total 
Program Risk Model discussed later.  Table 3 summarizes the advantages and 
disadvantages of each.    
 
 39
Table 3.   Comparison of Technical Risk Management Approaches. From (NAVSO P-3686,  
 1998, p. 6) 
SO P-3686 devotes an entire chapter (Chapter 5) to engineering 
fundamentals. 
area.      
Approach Advantages Disadvantages 
Process • Proactive focus on critical processes 
• Encourages market search for best 
practices/benchmarks 
• Reliance on fundamental design, test, and 
manufacturing principles 
• Addresses pervasive and subtle sources of 
risk 
• Technical discipline will pay dividends in 
cost and schedule benefits 
 
• Less emphasis on the product 
oriented elements of a program 
• Perception that technical issues 




• Commonly accepted approach using a 
logical, product oriented structure 
• Relates the elements of work to be 
accomplished to each other and to the end 
product 
• Separates a defense material item into its 
component parts 
• Allows tracking of product items down to 
any level of interest 
• Does not typically emphasize 
critical design and manufacturing 
processes, or product cost 
• Risk is typically expressed as a 
probability estimate rather than a 
process variance 






• Maximizes the advantages of Process and 
Product approaches 




 These are defined as basic disciplined processes and practices associated 
with the design, test, and production functions.  This sounds very much like the 
Willoughby Templates which in fact is the case.  This chapter contains a compilation of 
the design, test, and production template areas with associated best practices and 
measures of effectiveness from earlier Navy publications.  The items were updated as 
necessary with new best practices and lessons learned.  It also expands the list of “Watch-
Out-Fors” originally included in Methods & Metrics.  A “Watch-Out-For” is defined as 
“requirements, conditions, materials, types of equipment or parts, and processes that 
almost invariably create potential or actual risk.”  (NAVSO P-3686, 1998, p. 19).   




Figure 6. Design Reviews Template Abbreviated “Watch-Out-For” List.  
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instead of technical reviews
•Review schedule based on 
milestone dates
•Reviews don’t cover technical 
information
•etc..






•Best Practice COST ASSESSMENT
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2. Total Program Risk 
Figure 7 illustrates a Total Program Risk Model, which includes both qualitative 
and quantitative risk assessment methods.  It comprises an Integrated Process/Product 
approach to technical risk assessment as recommended by NAVSO P-3686.  All risk 
management and assessment methods used by government and industry can fit within this 
generic model.  Risk can be categorized as either technical or non-technical.  Technical 
risk is comprised of Process and Product risk.  Process risk looks at the variance between 
current program practice and best practice as outlined in the Willoughby Templates.  
Product risk is hardware and software product related and based on expert opinion and 
technology maturity.  The WBS is often used as a roadmap for Product risk identification.  
Both Process and Product risk assessments are considered qualitative approaches because 
the risks are determined through purely subjective assessments by the 
evaluators/assessors.  In addition, they rely on subjective risk classifying (rating) criteria.  
This means there is a potential for two or more assessors to arrive at different risk levels 
while using the same subjective criteria.  Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods 
are grouped under the technical risk category and are typically product specific based on 
“what if” scenarios and Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA).    
The other major component of the Total Program Risk Model is non-technical 
risk.  Non-technical risk can be both qualitative and quantitative.  The qualitative 
component is simply those programmatic risks that don’t qualify as a process or product 
(technical) risk.  The quantitative components of non-technical risk consist of Cost and 
Schedule Risk Analysis using Monte Carlo simulation methods.  Since technical risk has 
been defined as process-based risk that drives all other risk, the Cost and Schedule Risk 
Analysis methods are considered non-technical risk in this model.  Recall, the qualitative 
technical risk component assesses the impact to cost and schedule in addition to 
performance.  The difference lies in the fact that Monte Carlo simulation techniques are 
not used to quantify the risk as with Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis methods.    
Ideally, both technical and non-technical qualitative and quantitative methods 
should be used to ensure complete risk coverage.  However, most acquisition programs 
use either a qualitative or quantitative method, but not both.  Within the Navy, qualitative 
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methods are used predominately.  In general, the Air Force and NASA are users of 
quantitative methods.     
 
Figure 7. Total Program Risk Model 
 
 
3. Risk Assessment Techniques:  The Qualitative Approach 
rocess based 
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beyond a standard contractual audit.  Recall, the focus was on best practices, not simply 
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Cost Risk AssessmentCost Risk Analysis 
Schedule Risk Assessment Schedule Risk Analysis 
Non-Technical Risk Assessment 
Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment 
Methods & Metrics provided the first graphical representation of a p
essment strategy using a qualitative approach.  The methodology outlined in this 
guidance document was a proven process that had been in use by some acquisition 
professionals for nearly 10 years since the release of the Willoughby Templates in 1985.  
However, it remained undocumented until now.  This methodology was used extensively 
for conducting PRRs to assess transition from development to production risk just prior 
to MS III.  It was used by independent risk assessment teams tasked by program 
managers to conduct independent risk assessments on their programs, prime contractors, 
critical subcontractors, or key suppliers.  It was a methodology of choice for contractor 
evaluations, such as technical assistance visits, because it provided a license to look 
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contractual requirements.  Often, a program office would have a risk written against it for 
not contractually requiring of a contractor a best engineering practice.  Everyone is fair 
game in a risk assessment, and it does not just focus on contract compliance issues.  The 
methodology has been refined slightly since Methods & Metrics was released in 1994 to 
add product and non-technical risk paths.  Figure 8 provides a look at this methodology 
and highlights the process based risk assessment path.  Process risk assessment is the 
recommended starting point for any risk assessment as Process risk leads to Product risk.  
After Process risks have been identified, the Product and non-technical risk assessment 
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Process identification is the first step in a purely process-based risk 
assessment approach.  The approach is to identify the critical engineering, manufacturing 
and management processes in place for the current phase of the acquisition program.  
Let’s illustrate with an example.  Let’s take an acquisition program in the Engineering & 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase (System Development & Demonstration 
phase per the new DoD 5000 series).  The prime contractor chooses to implement 
selected design analysis tools, including reliability prediction and Failure Modes Effects 
& Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  Hence, we have just identified the design analysis 
processes used on this program.   
b. Process Baselining 
The second step in a purely process-based risk assessment approach is to 
perform process baselining.  This step determines the industry best practice for program’s 
critical processes identified in the previous step.  This constitutes the technical baseline 
for the program’s critical processes.  Sources of best practice guidance information can 
be found in DoD 4245.7-M, NAVSO P-6071, Methods & Metrics for Product Success,  
NAVSO P-3686, and BMP’s Program Manager’s Workstation.  Expert opinion of subject 
matter experts is another key source of best practice information.   
Let’s continue with our example.  Best practice dictates a more 
comprehensive design analysis tool kit be used during EMD, including sneak circuit 
analysis and worst-case tolerance analysis.  As a matter of fact, these tools should be 
applied during the previous phase as well.  Any of the technical risk guidance documents 
mentioned in this thesis would recommend a more expansive application of design 
analysis tools to minimize risk.   
Sometimes the process baseline is dictated by the customer.  In this case 
the customer/program specifies the baseline practice for the critical process.  In our 
example, let’s assume that a thermal analysis was mandated by the customer.  Hence, the 
technical baseline is defined by an industry best practice or by the customer or a 
on 
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combination of both.  This is known as program specified baseline practices for the 
critical proce . er dictates process baselines through 
specifications,
c. Risk Assessment 
a risky process.   
The amount of variance determines the risk level.  Risks are classified as 
High, Moderate, and Low.  Risks are classified by using subjective assessment criteria, 
and the most c
d. Risk Recording & Classification 
luding risk mitigation plans and milestones.  It also 
assigns ownership responsibility to an individual or IPT to ensure the risk is addressed.  
Most effectiv
sses  Typically, the custom
 standards, and other contractual requirements.  The thermal analysis is a 
program-specified baseline practice specified by the customer.   
The next step in the process is the conduct of the risk assessment.  This is 
the act of measuring the variance between best practice (industry benchmark) and the 
program/project’s practice.  If the baseline practice is customer specified, it still must be 
compared to best practice, and if it does not meet best practice, a risk should be written 
against the customer for invoking 
ommon methods will be discussed in the next paragraph.  In our example, 
the best practice guidance documents dictate additional design analysis tools, such as 
sneak circuit and worst-case tolerance analyses, that should be used on this program to 
minimize technical risk.  Since these additional tools are not used on this program, there 
is some level of variance between standard practice and best practice.  Risk classification 
methods are used to evaluate the level of risk.    
The next step in the technical process-based approach path is Risk 
Recording & Classification.  This step involves documenting the risk on a Risk 
Identification Form (RIF) or in a risk database and classifying the risk into High, 
Moderate, or Low risk levels.  The RIF contains all the necessary fields to adequately 
document and track the risk inc
e and productive risk management programs then transfer the RIF 
information into a risk database.  This is needed in order to effectively and efficiently 
track, trend, and report the data.   
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Many programs automate the risk identification process to facilitate data 
entry.  The process and database must be user friendly or people will not use it; a lesson 
learned from experience.  A sample RIF is shown in Figure 9 and Appendix A.  The 
appendix also includes instructions for completing each field of the RIF.  
ods available for classifying or assigning a risk 
level to a risk.  All methods are considered qualitative, because they are subjective in 
nature, some more than others.  The earliest methods consisted of a simple qualitative list 
of criteria for each risk level (Low, Moderate, and High).  They were developed to 
support technical risk assessments conducted using the Willoughby Templates.  Each 
Service developed their own set of narrative criteria independently because there was 
lassification criteria in an instruction 
(NAVSEAINS
A sample set of narrative classification criteria is shown in Figure 10.  It 
was aptly named the “Risk Ruler” and is the culmination of 14 years of use and 
development b av ) Corona Division and this author 
in support of independent risk assessments and PRRs.  NSWC Corona used “Risk Ruler” 
extensively to assign risk levels in support of technical risk assessments on various 
NAVSEA and SPAWAR ACAT I and II programs.  It was updated many times with 
lessons learned to improve the rating capabilities.  It is still used today as a backup and 
check on the results of newer matrix based methods.  It is a purely qualitative collection 
of subjective classification criteria.   
There are a number of meth
little guidance available.  NAVSEA provided risk c
T 4800.2A), which was canceled a few years later without replacement.  
Within each Service, each program office used different criteria, if they conducted risk 
assessments at all.  The three categories of risk levels remained the only common aspect 
concerning these narrative criteria.  The lack of standardization made it difficult to assess 
the relative severity of risk among various acquisition programs especially among the 
Services.   







RISK IDENTIFICATION FORM TRACKING NUMBER





Date Identified DERIVED RISK LEVEL





(Use P(f) & C(f) Tables and R(f) Matrix)
Rf:





Consequence of Occurrence (Cf):
Schedule:
Cost:
RISK DESCRIPTION & RECOMMENDATIONS:
RISK LEVEL RATIONALE:





DISCLAIMER:  The Risk Assessment Team does not have the authority to direct the Contractor in any way nor alter the Contractor’s
contractual obligations.  The Contractor shall take no action unless changes are issued in writing from the Contracting Officer.  Any
changes taken without official approval from the Contracting Officer shall be taken at the Contractor’s own risk.
 
Figure 9. Sample Risk Identification Form. From (NSWC Corona, 2000) 
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Risk Ruler 
Risk Level Standard Guidelines 
 
Low Risk 
A Low Ri en there are few en standard p ut the 
differences are not likely to impact Performance, Schedule, or Cost.  A Low Ri ormal business 
Risk.  Normally, plans are in place to manage the risk and personnel have past experience dealing with the risk on 
previous programs.  Low Risks are the most c ategory beca ent to 
production contains an inherent, unav degree of Risk.  The followi Low Risk 
category: 
• Few differences betwee t practices. 
• The Government Progra of the differen
• Low probability of impa ormance, Schedule or 
• Normal business Risk. 
• A solution is demonstrated and plans are in place to implement a solution. 
 
Moderate Risk 
A Moderate Risk is assigned when there are some differences between standard practices and best practices.  
Increased management attention and monitoring is needed to correct the differences before they affect 
Performance, Schedule, or Cost.  Normally, plans are in place to correct the risk, although the solution may not 
necessarily have been demonstrated.  A Moderate Risk can also be assigned when no plans are in place, but there is 
adequate reserve capacity to deal with the risk.  The primary difference between the Moderate and High Risk is that 
m .  The following properties characterize the Moderate Risk category: 
• Some differences between standard and best practices. 
• The Government Program Office is aware of the Risk. 
• Contractor Management is Aware of the Risk. 
• Some probability of impacting Performance, Schedule or Cost. 
• A proposed solution exists. 
• A preliminary plan is in place with an interim Schedule for implementation. 
• Little slack time to resolve the risk. 
High Risk 
A High Risk is assigned when there are significant and substantial differences betwee actices and best 
practices.  Intense management attention is needed to correct the risk before it affec ance, Schedule, or 
Cost.  Management (either Contractor or Navy Management) may not be aware  risk and no plan exists to 
mitigate the Risk.  A High Risk can also be assigned if plans exist but they are being inadequately implemented or 
there is no slack time to implement the plans before Performance, Schedule, or Cost is affected.  The following 
properties characterize the High Risk category: 
• Significant and Substantial differences exist between standard and best practices. 
• The Government Program Office may not be aware of the differences. 
• Risk has High probability of impacting Performance, Schedule or Cost. 
• No slack time to implement a solution. 
Immediate High Level of management attention required.
 
sk is assigned wh differences betwe ractices and best practices, b
sk is considered a n
ommon Risk c use the transition from developm
oidable ng properties characterize the 
n standard and bes
m Office is aware ces. 
cting Perf Cost. 
• Adequate slack time to resolve the risk. 





• Contractor Management may not be aware of the differences. 
• No plan or Schedule in place to implement a solution. 





Figure 10.  Risk Ruler. From (NSWC Corona, 2000)
 “Risk Ruler” was used exclusively as classification criteria for risk 
assessments and PRRs until matrix methods were introduced by some DoD contractors in 
the mid-1990s and promoted by ASN(RD&A).  Now, matrix methods are taught to our 
acquisition workforce professionals at DAU, along with PMWS.  Matrix methods were 
developed to provide for some consistency among evaluators when assigning risk levels.  
Matrix methods help to normalize risk level assignments.  
One risk classification matrix method which has grown to become the 
most widely used method within the Navy is the 5 X 5 probability of occurrence versus 
consequence matrix method.  Originally developed by McDonnell Douglas Aerospace for 
the F/A-18 program in the mid-90s, it has grown to be a standard throughout DoD 
((ASN(RD&A)ABM, 1997, p. 13).  There are many variants of this method also used 
within the Services and Industry including 3 X 3 and 10 X 10 matrices.   
What led to the transformation from narrative “Risk Ruler” classification 
methods to matrix methods?  Acquisition reform brought an emphasis on risk awareness.  
Programs took more risk, and needed more efficient and accurate ways of assessing risk 
and assigning risk levels.  Risk assessments had to be more proactive by including the 
probability of occurrence in the rating scheme.   
Risk has two components:  a probability of occurrence P(f) (i.e., 
likelihood) and a consequence of occurrence C(f) (i.e., impact).  Consequence is typically 
defined as having an impact on cost, schedule, and performance parameters.  Prior to 
acquisition reform, technical risk assessments really did not look at the probability of 
occurrence.  The focus was on consequence or impact.  The “Risk Ruler” is a great 
example.  There is little about probability of occurrence in this criteria other than the 
words referring to “low,” “some,” and “high probability.”   In fact these words are new 
perturbations added to the “Risk Ruler” somewhat recently.  The problem with assigning 
a risk level using only the consequence parameter is that it results in an inefficient means 
f prioritizing risks for mitigation.  For instance, a High risk may be assigned because if 
 occurs it could have a significant cost, schedule, or performance impact on the 
program.  Becau priority item for 
o
it
se it is assigned a High risk, it would be a top 
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mitigation.  However, in actuality the probability of occurrence may be very low, so the 
risk should ha




fferent risk level ratings while using the 
same criteria, such as the “Risk Ruler.”  For both these reasons of more efficient 
prioritization and reduction in subjectivity, the Services and their contractors are using  
5 X 5 or equivalent P(f) vs. C(f) matrices to classify risk.  ASN(RD&A)ABM’s 1997 
Risk Management Survey confirms this fact that of the 41 Navy acquisition programs 
surveyed, the predominant risk classification method used was the P(f) vs. C(f) matrix 
method ((ASN(RD&A)ABM, 1997, p. 6).  This method is used to classify risk for all 
categories of risk:  technical, non-technical, and programmatic.  A typical 5 X 5 risk 
classification matrix is shown in Figure 11.  Variants of the 5 X 5 Matrix Method are 
shown in Appendix B.   
ve been assigned a low priority for mitigation.  This failure to include a 
likelihood of the risk occurring was not such an issue prior to acquisition reform when 
defense budgets were large.  Most of the risks could be addressed because resources were 
available.  After the end of the Cold War and the start of declining defense budgets, most 
programs had limited resources available for mitigation actions, and had to prioritize 
risks more accurately, necessitating the addition of a prob
on formula.  No longer could programs mitigate every risk.  In addition, 
risks were being identified much earlier to affect a more proactive approach.  The earlier 
risks are identified the cheaper it is to manage and reduce the risk.   
Matrix methods also provide an added bonus of reducing subjectivity.  
The matrix method is a little more quantitative because it assigns a rating value (whole 
number) to the probability of occurrence and consequence.  It is 
ause the assignment of whole number ratings is based on subjective criteria 
contained in the probability of occurrence and consequence tables.  Because traditional 
narrative criteria is transformed into a whole number rating, this in effect normalizes the 
risk rating (classification) process.  With a purely subjective risk classifying approach, 
there is the potential for assessors to arrive at di
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 Level Probability (Product / Process) Definition (Product Risk) 
1 Unlikely / Using Existing and Proven 
Industrial Best Practice 
Extremely Rare.  Current Actions OK.  Easily and 
Quickly resolved. 
2 Some Chance Low Likelihood.  Current strategy should resolve this 
3 Even Shot / Newly Developed and 
Proven Process or Not Industrial Best 
Practice 
Likely to occur.  Current strategy may or may not resolve 
this issue.  Work-arounds may be required. 
4 Good Chance Highly Likely.  Current strategy will probably fail to 
resolve issue.  Alternative plans will be required. 
 Very Good Chance / Using Unproven Near Certainty.  Current strategy will not resolve this 
(management) attention. 
 
Probability of Occurrence (IF) 
issue. 





































Level Technical/Performance Schedule Cost 




No Work-Arounds Needed 
Minor Slip (Won’t Affect 
Critical Path) 
Small Reduction in 
Contractor/Activity's 
Management Reserve (MR) 
Margin 



















Consequence of Occurrence (THEN) 
Assume Event H
(For Overall Risk Level Classification use Highest Level among consequence parameters.) 
 Moderate Reduction Moderate Slip (May Affect Significant Reduction In 
Margin 
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Level is the intersection of the Probability of Occurrence P(f) value and the largest of the 
Consequence o
 Risk is defined as the uncertainty of attaining a future goal.  The key is “a 
future goal,” not a current event or an event that has already occurred.  If it is a current 
event or an event that has already occurred, then it is a problem, not a risk.  If it is a sure 
thing (100% probability), then it is a problem, not a risk.  A risk is a future event which 
might occur if risk mitigation actions are not taken.  Too often risks do not get sufficient 
management attention until they result in problems.  By this time it is too late and 
corrective actions almost always cost more and take longer.   
Risk is quantified by assessing the intersection of probability and 
consequence.  The probability of occurrence table looks at how likely it is the risk event 
will occur on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is unlikely to occur and 5 is a very good chance 
that it will occur (almost certainty or 100% probability).  The definitions in the 
Probability Column apply nicely to Process risk.  The definitions in the Definitions 
Column apply nicely to Product risk, as well as non-technical and programmatic risk.  
Table definitions may be tailored by program/project.   
The consequence of occurrence table looks at the severity or impact the 
risk event may have on cost, schedule, and performance assuming the event has occurred.  
A whole number value in the range of 1 to 5 must be assigned to each consequence 
parameter (i.e., cost, schedule, and performance).  Each whole number value for 
performance, schedule, and cost must be annotated on the RIF.  The highest rating for all 
three consequence parameters is used to obtain the overall risk level or risk factor and is 
also annotated on the RIF.  The assumption is that each consequence parameter (i.e., cost, 
schedule, and performance) is equally weighted.  Unless otherwise stated in the C(f) table 
definitions, the criteria can be applied to the process, product (hardware/software), and 
program levels.  This is why the criteria are written in a generic fashion.  Table 
definitions/criteria may be tailored by program/project.        
The Resultant Risk Level R(f), also known as Derived or Cumulative Risk 
Level or Risk Factor, is determined using the cube in Figure 11.  The Resultant Risk 
e.  It provides f Occurrence C(f) values for cost, schedule, and performanc
for the calculat
vides too many choices and 
slows down th
” be used in conjunction with the  
5 X 5 Matrix 
 recommended fields of risk 
data that shoul
ion of an overall risk level based on whole number ratings.  This R(f) cube 
can also be tailored depending on how lenient or conservative you want to be.  For 
instance, some programs change cell (3,4) from “H” (High) to “M” (Moderate).       
Why use a 1 to 5 scale?  This appears to be an optimum scale for trying to 
quantify a subjective process, which is substantiated by this author’s experience in using 
this scale.  Some programs use a 3 X 3 matrix.  This does not provide for enough 
dispersion.  Some programs use a 10 X 10 matrix.   This pro
e classification process.  It is also more difficult to use by the assessor and 
provides for too many choices, hence it is difficult to obtain any sort of repeatability or 
consistency among assessors.  The 5 X 5 Matrix Method is highly recommended by this 
author because it is simple and easy to use with short and succinct classification criteria 
and is also tailorable by program/project. 
“Risk Ruler” can be used alone or in conjunction with the 5 X 5 Matrix 
Method.  The author recommends that the “Risk Ruler
Method to validate the results.  Words/verbiage from the “Risk Ruler” 
should be used to fill in the “Risk Level Rationale” field of the RIF.  “Risk Ruler” should 
be used to adjudicate disagreements on risk level assignments among assessors/ 
evaluators. 
Documenting the risk is an important task that must be given due 
diligence.  Roughly 80% of the complete risk assessment and management effort is 
attributed to data collection and documentation.   It takes time, but it must be done right.  
The RIF shown in Figure 9 and Appendix A is one method of collecting risk information.  
Detailed definitions for each field are also provided in Appendix A.  Many programs 
today use automated risk databases to identify, collect, track, and report risk information.  
Regardless of the method of data collection, there are some
d be collected as shown in Figure 9 and are described below.   
The “Process Area” field of the RIF is where the process area under 
review is annotated.  For those using the Willoughby Templates as an assessment 
baseline, the Willoughby Template category is referenced in the field along with the 
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applicable template area.  For example, if a risk was written against a contractor’s 
Configuration Control process, the individual filling out the RIF would put “Design” in 
the Category block and “Configuration Control” in the Template block.  If more than one 
template appli
 and C(f) rating numbers were selected.  The 
“Derived Risk
chedules may be attached as separate documentation to the RIF when 
additional spac
 assessment 
approach.   
es to the risk, the most applicable one is chosen.  This will make the 
reporting process by template much easier.   
The “Risk Level Identifiers” field is where the assessor’s ratings for P(f) 
and C(f) are documented (if this method is used).  If the “Risk Ruler” is used instead, 
then the risk level rationale from the “Risk Ruler” is written in the “Risk Level 
Rationale” field of the RIF.  Some risk management programs use both the probability 
and consequence matrix method and “Risk Ruler” approaches to arrive at an overall 
(derived) risk level.  If the matrix method approach is used, the “Risk Level Rationale” 
field is used to explain why certain P(f)
 Level” field is where the overall risk rating is documented resulting from 
the classification method chosen.   
The RIF has a “Risk Owner/IPT” field and a “Contractor Response with 
Mitigation Plan & Schedule” field.  Thus, the RIF provides for complete closed-loop 
traceability from risk ownership to mitigation planning and scheduling.  Risk mitigation 
plans and s
e is required.  RIFs should be placed in a risk management database for 
tracking, trend analysis, and reporting.  Appendix C provides a sample risk write-up. 
Continuing with the flow of the top-level Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Model in Figure 8, Risk Recording & Classification is where the path converges with the 
other qualitative approaches, such as Product & Non-technical.  From this point on the 
same steps apply to all qualitative and quantitative approaches.  These common steps are 
Risk Recording & Classification, Risk Mitigation, Risk Reporting, and Follow-up 
Activities.  These remaining steps have to be taken regardless of the risk
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e. Risk Mitigation 
The next step in the process-based approach path is Risk Mitigation -- 
what to do with the risk once it is identified and classified.  As mentioned previously, this 
step is not unique to a qualitative technical risk management approach.  It also applies to 
any of the qualitative and quantitative methods.  Risk mitigation consists of planning and 
executing task




hould be placed on the RIF and made perfectly clear to the activity under 
review before, during, and at the end of the risk assessment.   
s to reduce the identified risk to an acceptable level.  After the assessor 
documents the risk and assigns a risk level with rationale, the contractor (or government 
activity) typically completes a POA&M or mitigation plan for reducing the risk.  The 
Contractor/Activity must complete the activity response field of the RIF.  The mitigation 
plan must be summarized in the “Activity Response With Mitigation Plan/Schedule” 
field of the RIF or attached as a separate document to the RIF.  In today’s IPT 
environment the mitigation plan is often drafted by an IPT, which includes customer 
representation.  This field must list mitigation plans with key events and milestones.  This 
is necessary in order to feed bac
) planning packages so the mitigation plans get incorporated as program 
work elements.  This ensures the work gets done and that resources are allocated to 
implement the mitigation plans. 
The assessor often provides risk mitigation recommendations as part of the 
“Risk Description” on the RIF.  This is valuable because it gives the responsible activity 
a place to start with risk mitigation actions.  Remember, risk assessment teams
subject matter experts, and their advice and recommendations should be 
heeded.   
The assessor is cautioned, however, not to give or appear to give 
contractual direction.  The assessor is not authorized to do so.  Any actions taken by the 
Contractor/Activity on recommendations made by assessors shall be taken at the 
Contractor/Activity’s own risk or within the constraints of the contract.  A disclaimer to 
that effect s
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Mitigation plans are typically only written for Moderate and High risks.  
This is why ri
management and the customer.  Risks and risk mitigation status are followed up on and 
reassessed until closed or reduced to acceptable levels.  Risk reporting consists of two 
levels.  The first level of reporting is comprised of risk assessment team reports resulting 
from on-site risk assessments.  A typical outline for a technical risk assessment report 
after an on-site risk assessment of a contractor/activity/program by a risk assessment 
team is as follows: 
• Risk Identification Forms for all risks 
 
written by technical risk 
assessment team leaders to summarize what their team found.  Typical risk assessment 
(functional area) teams are: 
sks are classified into three levels (L, M, H), so limited resources can be 
allocated to the most significant areas for mitigation.  Low risks should still be monitored 
to make sure the risk levels do not escalate.  Some programs write mitigation plans for 
Low risks in addition to High and Moderate risks.  Mitigation plans and schedules must 
also be included in the risk management database if used.  It is highly recommended that 
a risk management database be used to ease the tracking of risk mitigation plans and 
actions.   
f. Risk Reporting 
 The next step is to report risk status which is done periodically to 
 
• Executive Summary 
• Functional Area Summaries (Management/Funding/Transition 
Planning, Production/Facilities/Logistics, and Design & Test) 
• Red, Yellow, Green Quick Look Risk Template Summary Chart  
• Risk mitigation recommendations 
• Risk mitigation planning, milestones, and corrective actions 
• Risk identification, classification, and mitigation trend analysis 
• Waterfall Charts showing risk mitigation progress over time 
Functional area summaries are generally 
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• Program Management 
• Reliability/Design 
• Test & Evaluation 
• Production/Facilities/Logistics 
 
The next level of reporting is a higher level of reporting for management.  
It consists of a stop light presentation of program risks.  Figure 12 shows an example of 
this type of risk report for a technical risk assessment conducted per the Willoughby 
Templates.  Th  green template report shows in graphical, color-
coded format 
k Look Reporting Format. From (NSWC Corona, 2000) 
is quick look red, yellow,
what the risk levels are per template area for the project/program being 
reviewed.  It can also be applied at the subcontractor and supplier levels.  Additional 
templates or review areas can also be added to this template tree. 
P R O D U C T
T Q M /IP P D
F U N D IN G
M O N E Y  P H A S IN G
D E S IG N
M O D E R A T E
H IG H




Figure 12. Sample Quic
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 How are risk levels rolled up?  Each template contains a number of control 
methods as outline  Templates (DoD 4245.7-M) or stated as questions 
in the TRIMS database.  The highest risk assigned to a control method or question within 
a template area becomes the risk level assigned to the entire template.  In other words, if 
there are 10 control methods or questions under the Design Policy Template and one of 
the 10 control 
 others.  Appendix D 
provides samples of additional reporting methods.   
g. Follow-up Activities 
This is the final critical step in both a qualitative and quantitative risk 
assessment process and is the key to effective risk mitigation or corrective action.  This is 
done through periodic re-assessment of risks and verification of risk mitigation actions.  
Constant feedback will ensure that program/project risks are known and are being 
managed appropriately.   
A common mistake is not following-up on Low risks or closed risks.  
Many Low risks, if not periodically monitored, could escalate into higher level risks, 
transforming themselves from a benign issue or normal business practice into something 
more serious impacting one or more cost, schedule, and performance parameters.   
Another common mistake is not periodically following-up on closed or 
accepted risks.  Accepted risks are those risks normally closed at a higher risk level with 
rationale stating that nothing can be done to mitigate the issue.  Thus, they must be 
accepted by the program/project.  Closed and accepted risks must be periodically re-
addr ents 
d in the Willoughby
methods/questions is a High risk, 3 of 10 are a Moderate Risk, 5 are a Low 
risk, and one is Not Applicable, then the Template is assigned an overall risk level of 
High or Red.  The worst-case risk level drives the overall risk level for the Template.  In 
a similar manner the worst case Template drives the rolled up risk level at the Template 
Category level (i.e., Design, Test, Production, Facilities, Logistics, Management).  
TRIMS does not use a worst-case method, but instead uses a tailorable weighting scheme 
that renders certain assessment questions more important than
essed to ensure that the risk issue has not been re-opened due to new developm
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or current actions.  Accepted risks bear watching for potential risk mitigation solutions 
that may surfa
and risk.  Our product development 
models encour nagers are told there are no opportunities 
without risk.  Risk management has been elevated to a key component of project 
management.  With the greater emphasis on risk identification and mitigation there has 
emerged a need for more quantitative risk assessment methods.  A purely subjective 
assessment of risk level is not always adequate to assess the probability of occurrence and 
impact on a mission critical event, such as an O-ring failure on a solid rocket booster.  
Often more insight is needed which qualitative methods cannot provide.  Wouldn’t it be 
nice to model
oss of 
right or left 
ce over time.  A good example is a sole-source supplier of a critical 
hardware item.  This is a program risk, and at the time the risk was written there were no 
other suppliers in the world capable of producing the same item.  Now, a few years later 
there are a couple of alternate suppliers available.  This risk may be re-opened and risk 
mitigation measures taken to try and qualify one of the new suppliers as an alternate 
source.  Keep in mind that a change in one risk’s risk level can affect another risk’s risk 
level.  Insight into risk mitigation efforts is the key.  Insight is gathered through thorough 
risk assessment follow-up activities. 
 
4.       Risk Assessment Techniques:  The Quantitative Approach 
A risk awareness culture was brought about by acquisition reform.  Programs are 
taking more risk and thus accepting more risk.  The goal of the systems engineering 
process is to balance cost, schedule, performance, 
age risk taking.  Program ma
 in probabilistic terms how likely it is that an O-ring might fail on the 
shuttle during launch for a certain temperature range?  Wouldn’t it also be nice to know 
what the impact would be if the risk event occurs?  For the solid rocket booster O-ring an 
example of a quantitative impact might be loss of a certain percentage of thrust, l
booster, or in the worst case scenario loss of vehicle and the crew.  
Qualitative methods would only provide a Low, Moderate, or High risk of O-ring failure 
resulting in loss of vehicle.   
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Decision makers are faced daily with critical decisions that can impact cost, 
schedule, performance, and safety.  Thus, they desire as much insight as possible into 
their programs and that includes risk.   
Over the past decade, quantitative risk assessment methods and techniques have 
grown considerably within government and industry.  NASA has been a forerunner in the 
development, acceptance, and use of one of the more popular quantitative methods called 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).  This driving force by NASA all started after the 
Challenger disaster.  (NASA, 2000, p. 1)  
PRA is a quantitative probabilistic modeling process that uses a variety of logical 
analysis tools, such as FMEA and fault tree analysis, to identify risk scenarios and 
quantif sk. nts, the 
probab
 
methods to conduct safety studies.  Sandia National Laboratories developed PRA 
methods to conduct safety studies of nuclear weapons, and expanded to include studies of 
nuclear reactor safety in the 1970s.  PRA results were used to justify the safety and 
continued existence of nuclear power reactors for electricity generation.  (Sandia, n.d., ¶ 
1)      
y ri  As with qualitative methods, PRA is comprised of two compone
ility of occurrence and consequence of occurrence.  The difference lies in how the 
risk is classified.  Qualitative methods use subjective assessments, such as Low, 
Moderate, and High.  Quantitative PRA methods assign a probability or frequency 
number to the likelihood of occurrence.  The consequence component is also assigned a 
numerical value (i.e., number of individuals potentially killed).  (Stamatelatos, 2000, p. 1) 
PRA originated in the early 1960s in the aerospace industry and missile programs.  
The Apollo program shunned PRA when an analysis revealed a very low probability of 
success of landing a man on the moon.  Instead, NASA focused on engineering discipline 
and process rigor.  As Stamatelatos (2000, ¶ 4) aptly phrased it, “NASA decided to rely 
on the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) method for system safety 
assessments…FMEA continues to be required by NASA in all its safety related projects.”   
While NASA ignored PRA methods, the nuclear industry started using these 
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Over the course of 20 years from the 1960s to the 1980s, PRA methods were 
refined, improved, and expanded to other industries including petroleum, chemical, and 
environmental industries.  By the time of the Challenger accident, PRA methods had 
repeate
and decision support tool.   
dly proven their ability to uncover design and operational weaknesses that many 
experts could not find using conventional methods.  One output of the Challenger 
investigation was a recommendation that PRA methods be used by NASA to estimate the 
probability of failure of critical shuttle components.  Since this time, PRA methods have 
been used as an important risk assessment 
Within the last few years NASA has undertaken a corporate effort to expand their 
in-house capabilities in PRA.  They are training people to increase awareness and use of 
PRA.  Recent directives have been released which mandate the use of PRA on high 
profile and mission critical systems.  NASA just released in August 2002 a Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners.  It can be 
downloaded from the following site:  http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/risk/risk.htm.  
(NASA, 2000, pp. 1-5) 
PRA methods are expected to grow in both government and commercial 
industr
highly 
 on the Integrated Master Schedule.  These methods provide for a probability 
estimation of how likely the program will meet cost and schedule targets.  The Schedule 
ies.  (Stamatelatos, 2000, p. 3)  Recently, the nuclear regulatory commission and 
the environmental protection agency have started using PRA methods.   
The use of PRA methods in the Navy for technical risk management is not 
common.  Although the predominate method used is the qualitative approach, NAVAIR 
appears to have small pockets of PRA use.   
NASA is a clear leader in the PRA field.  If history does indeed repeat itself, it is 
likely that PRA methods within NASA will rub off on the military services.  It has 
happened before with risk avoidance methods and process rigor.   
Our Total Program Risk Model, Figure 7, discussed previously illustrates two 
additional quantitative risk assessment methods that are non-technical.  These methods 






 also considered in addition to the most likely value.  This data 
collect
rom the 3-point 
distribution and calculates total program costs and completion dates.  After many 
iterations (approximately 3000) of the simulation tool, the results converge on final 
values.  These results provide the most likely project end dates and costs which are not 
what the project scheduling tool indicated for Estimates at Completion (EAC).  Hence, 
there is
roject will not meet its 
estimat
nalysis is conducted on the project schedule using a Monte Carlo simulation add-
in to MS Project or equivalent Critical Path Method (CPM) scheduling tool.  The risk 
analysis assesses the uncertainty in the specified activity duration in the project schedule.  
A typical CPM scheduling tool assumes that the activity durations are known with 
certainty, which is not the case.  The scheduling software rolls up these durations to a 
project completion date.  Because of the inherent uncertainty in the activity durations, 
this completion date is not realistic.  A Schedule Risk Analysis takes into account the 
uncertainty in the durations by representing the uncertainty as a 
tion made up of 3-point estimates.  These 3-point estimates are the most likely, 
pessimistic, and optimistic durations.  The most likely activity duration is what is 
originally loaded into the schedule.  Cost account managers are interviewed by risk 
assessors to determine the worst case (pessimistic) and best case (optimistic) durations 
for each activity in the schedule.   
A similar methodology is used to conduct a Cost Risk Analysis, and the best case 
and worst case costs are
ion process is the most time consuming part of a Cost & Schedule Risk Analysis 
and accounts for approximately 80 to 90% of the effort.  Once the data is loaded, a simple 
Monte Carlo simulation tool is used which randomly selects values f
 some amount of cost and schedule risk associated with the EAC.  The risk is 
quantified in terms of a probability or percentage of exceeding costs and schedule.  For 
example, the simulation might output a 50% probability that the p
ed completion date.  From here, the probabilities can be partitioned into levels of 
risk (i.e., Low, Moderate, High).  (Hulett & Campbell, 2002, pp. 1-3) 
Monte Carlo simulation is based on several principles of probability and on the 
techniques of probability transformation.  One underlying principle is the law of large 
numbers, which states that the larger the sample the more certainly the sample mean will 
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be a good estimate of the population mean.  Monte Carlo simulation randomly generates 
values for uncertain variables repeatedly until a probability distribution is converged 
upon.  The more iterations that are applied in the Monte Carlo simulation, the smoother 
the probability distribution curve for project cost and schedule and the more accurate the 
results will be.  (“What is Monte Carlo,” n.d.) 
There are a number of commercially available software tools which perform Cost 
and Schedule Risk Analysis.  Most of these tools are add-ons for existing spreadsheet and 
project scheduling tools.  Crystal Ball is a Monte Carlo simulation add-on for Microsoft 
Excel, which can be used to perform a Cost Risk Analysis.  It is available from 
http://www.decisioneering.com.  Risk Plus and @Risk are add-ons for Microsoft Project 
and perform Monte Carlo simulations for Schedule Risk Analysis.  The more integrated 
approach uses Monte Carlo for Primavera which takes the input data from Primavera’s 
P3 project scheduling program and computes the Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis in the 
same si
similar to those associated with hardware development.  There must be no difference in 
amount of process rigor applied.  The reliance of today’s complex systems on computer 
has evolved into a complete software engineering approach.  Software has become a 
driving force in virtually every product that touches our lives.  Our complex weapon 
a disciplined engineering approach.  The risk of haphazard development is too great.  
Software engineering is a subset of the systems engineering process.  It encompasses 
processes, methods, metrics, programs, documents, tools, and data.  Software engineering 
is a process, and software is a product (i.e., it provides information).   
Because software engineering is a disciplined process, a process-based technical 
risk assessment strategy is necessary to measure how well software engineering 
mulation (Hulett & Campbell, 2002, pp. 13). 
       
E. SOFTWARE RISK MANAGEMENT 
It is imperative that software development practices follow a disciplined process 
programs and firmware continues to grow.  Over the past 20 years software development 
systems depend tremendously on fault free and accurate software products, which require 
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disciplines have been implemented.  The process-based technical risk assessment must be 
conducted early in development and continue throughout the coding, testing, and 
maintenance phases.  Ineffective process-based risk assessment on the software 
engineering process will lead to software product risk.  Again, our tenet of Process risk 
leads to Product risk is applicable.  (Pressman, 2001, pp. xxv, 2-3) 
m the Services and utilizes similar 
ability and impact rating tables.  They generally classify risk by risk component (i.e., 
role up each to an overall risk level by 
calcula
are CMM has five 
levels 
be implemented.  (Pressman, 2001, pp. 24-26)   
The Willoughby Templates, NAVSO P-6071, TRIMS, Methods & Metrics, and 
NAVSO P-3686 provide guidance and best practices for software design and test.  
Methods & Metrics provides some quantitative measures of effectiveness for software 
design and test.  NAVSO P-3686 provides an extensive list of qualitative and quantitative 
software measures.    
Industry uses a number of similar measures to assess software risk.  The use of 
checklists and lessons learned are prevalent in the literature.  Many of these are similar to 
the key questions asked within NAVSO P-6071 and the TRIMS database.  Industry has 
also adopted the probability vs. impact methods fro
prob
cost, schedule, performance, support, etc.) and 
ting a Risk Exposure (RE) number for each event:  RE = P x C, where P = 
probability of occurrence and C = consequence of occurrence.  Another method is very 
similar to a standard military Failure Modes Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  
Risks are rank ordered according to an evaluation of criticality (i.e., catastrophic, critical, 
marginal, negligible).  (Pressman, 2001, pp. 146-154) 
With the increasing emphasis on process maturity and discipline resulting from 
the software engineering process, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) developed a 
model of software engineering capabilities that should be in place within a software 
development organization for different maturity levels.  This Capability Maturity Model 
for Software (SW-CMM) defines key activities that must be in place at different levels of 
maturity to lower the risk during software development.  The softw
of maturity with Key Process Areas (KPA) defined within each level.  Each 
process area is defined by a set of key practices, which must be in place for the KPA to 
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Because CMM is process based it is not unlike the best practice methodology 
contained in the Navy templates approach.  In fact, DoD has adopted the CMM 
methodology to conduct CMM assessments on prime contractors, subcontractors, 
suppliers, and other key software developers.  CMM is a proactive technical risk 




e engineering process.  The five SW-CMM Levels are summarized in Table 4 
below.  Each level is an accumulation of all the lower levels (except Level 1): 
 
le 4.   Software Capability Maturity Matrix Levels. After (CMU/SEI-96-TR-023, p. 3) 
 
al The software process is characterized as ad hoc, and occasionally even 
chaotic.  Few processes are defined, and success depends on individual 
effort and heroics. 
2)  Repeatable Basic project management processes are established to track cost, 
schedule, and functionality.  The necessary process discipline is in 
place to repeat earlier successes on projects with similar applications. 
3)  Defined The software processes for both management and engineering activities 
are documented, standardized, and integrated into a standard software 
process for the organization.  All projects use an approved, tailored 
version of the organization’s standard software process for developing 
and maintaining software.   
4)  Managed Detailed measures of the software process and product quality are 
collected.  Both the software process and products are quantitatively 
understood and controlled. 
5)  Optimizing Continuous process improvement is enabled by quantitative feedback 
from the process and from piloting innovative ideas and technologies. 
 
SEI has published additional CMMs related to software development including a 
Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM) and a People Capability 
Maturity Model (P-CMM).  SA-CMM contains a collection of key practices to improve 
the software acquisition process.  P-CMM extends the organizational and management 
aspects of the software CMM to include best practices for the management of people to 




96-TR-023, CMU/SEI-95-MM-02)   
 









and co traction.  
quir
comm
• Softwa learly defined SE process plan. 
a
identif
 Software Subcontract Management (SM):  Evaluation metrics/management 
for quality. 
• Software Configuration Management (CM):  Integrity checking/ 
A for the SA-CMM.  CMU/SEI-97-HB-002 provides guidelines for implementing 
a software acquisition risk management program to meet the requirements of the 
acquisition risk management KPA of the SA-CMM.   This is a purely qualitative, best 
practices approach.   
  The software CMM Level process areas are given in greater detail below.  They 
are a summary of KPAs from the three software related maturity models mentioned 
above (i.e., SW-CMM, SA-CMM, and P-CMM).     (CMU/SEI-97-HB-002, 
• onary, on the fly responses to major problems.  Minimal business 
ence and understanding of existing processes/products.  
• Ad-h c - chaotic.   
ds on individual efforts. 
Level 2:  Re ble  KPAs:  
commitments to perform individual responsibilities.  Company 
itment to environment, resources, information, well-defined procedures 
mpensation, and minimal dis
• Re ements Management (RM):  Well established company/customer 
unications. 
re Project Planning (PP):  C
• Softw re Project Tracking and Oversight (PT):  Progress metrics which 
y plan deviation rapidly. 
•
for subcontractors. 
• Software Quality Assurance (QA):  Management and oversight of all phases 
establishment. 
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 Level 3:  Defined  KPAs:  
• Staff level of competency, skill, knowledge and participation.  Company 
response t
human res
o these attributes - recognition, reward.  Build company profiles of 
ources - commitment.  
Develop the skills and knowledge of employees 
 Integrated Software Management (IM):  Integrate and continuously enhance 
communication channels between Software Engineers and Management. 
• Software Product Engineering (PE):  Continuous process/product 
ination (IC):  Establish effective communication 
SE groups to review/define customer 
requirements. 
• Peer Reviews (PR):  Peer oversight of all work products for early defect 
 
Level 4:  Q





• ompetency Development:  Piloting innovative ideas and 
• ion (DP):  Perform root cause analysis of problems to 
adequately address them. 
• Technology Change Management (TM):  Identify areas that can be benefited 
by newer technologies and implement the changes seamlessly. 
• Organization Process Focus (PF):  Improve overall SE process capability. 
• Organization Process Definition (PD):  Determine core competency within 
organization.  Develop long term plans for continuous process improvement. 
• Training Program (TP):  
continuously. 
•
improvement through well-defined engineering process for effective, efficient 
software products. 
• Inter-group Coord
methodologies between all 
detection. 
uantitative or Managed KPAs: 
• Development of Mentoring program to encourage the reflection of excellence 
exhibited by certain key individuals to guide human resource management.  
• Quantitative Process Management (QP):  Detailed metrics/control
Software Quality Management (QM):  Use of these metrics to reach specific 
goals. 





• Process Change Management (PC):  Integrated product/process improvement. 
checklist o s and key performance areas, there is no 
guarant  t will 
apply t e
The software engineering process consists of seven phases of software 
development:  Requirements, Specification, Design, Implementation, Integration, 
Mainte
repair the s hase 
transiti i
Phase, the ess, and the Specification Phase, the second step.  For the 
softwar d
associated 
be the “Achilles heel” of the development effort.  Major changes required during the 
Integration or Maintenance Phases due to ambiguous, implied, or undocumented system 
ftware requirements presents significant risk to the program office and instability to the 
ted are related to requirements which are too 
narrow
requiremen
Software functionality must be directly mapped to the system requirements using 
a Requ m
requiremen sion.  Figure 13 shows the relative cost to repair software defects if 
und during the first six phases.   
As 
Process Ar  Guidebook Version 1.0, the SEI risk management strategy 
defines  
consists of  are performed as continuous activities throughout a 
softwar r
 
Although the software capability maturity models discussed above provide a good 
f critical software best practice
ee hat a software developer/vendor being certified to a particular CMM level 
hos  disciplines to your program.   
nance, and Retirement.  There is a direct correspondence between the cost to 
oftware product and the associated risks to system stability with each p
on n the software development.  The most critical phases are the Requirements 
first step in the proc
e eveloper, the time and subsequent cost, and for the program office, the risk 
with errors or omissions in these phases over the life cycle of the software can 
so
software contractor.  Other hazards presen
ly focused and scope creep (additional functionality requested after the 
ts have been defined). 
ire ents Traceability Matrix during the Specification Phase to reduce the risk of 
ts omis
fo
shown in CMU/SEI-97-HB-002, Software Acquisition Risk Management Key 
ea (KPA) -- A
 a systematic process for managing software acquisition risks.  The process 
 a number of functions that
e p oject’s life cycle.  Figure 14 is a graphical depiction of these functions. 
 69




























Figure 14. SEI Risk Management Process. From (CMU/SEI-97-HB-002, p. 4)  
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 Communication and documentation are the keys to reducing the risks associated 
with software acquisition and development.  The communication ensures that the 
program office adequately defines the requirements of the system, and the documentation 
creates a living record of the interactions between the program and developer.   
Software engineering is a process and like any process its performance can and 
should be measured.  Technical Performance Measures (TPM) are critical elements of the 
software engineering process.  These performance measures link well to the risk 
management process and provide another measure of software risk.  For instance, if a 
software performance measure is showing an adverse trend, then it is a good candidate 
for a risk write-up.  The same holds true for program level TPMs.  They should be 
watched and any adverse trends should warrant the generation of a risk write-up.  
Pressm  (2001) lists some typical software TPMs used in government and industry: 
 
 Quality Factors 
• Function Points (based on inputs, outputs, inquiries, master files, and interfaces) 
• Lines of Code 
• Complexity 
• Design structure quality index 
• Cohesion and Coupling 
• Interface design 
• Program length and volume 
• Software maturity index   
  
 has 
exploded in the commercial world and is quickly replacing conventional structural 
software engineering methods.  Software developers are attracted to OO methods because 
they create libraries of reusable classes, objects, and components.  This accelerates the 
an
•
 In the 1990s the Object Oriented (OO) software engineering methodology
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softwar
• Comment percentage   
• Weighted Methods per Class (WMC) 
• Response for a Class (RFC) 
• Lack of Cohesion of Methods (LCOM) 
• Coupling Between Object Classes (CBO) 
• Depth of Inheritance Tree (DIT) 
• Number of Children (NOC)   
 
development effort are inputs to the 
 assessment program.  Trends which do not meet industry 
best practice or an external (customer) or internal goal are fair game for a risk write-up.   
e development cycle and leads to higher quality software.  The OO paradigm is 
also attractive to DoD software acquisitions because of it modularity and ease of upgrade.  
Software developed with OO techniques “is easier to maintain because its structure is 
inherently decoupled.”   (Pressman, 2001, pp. 542) 
As with conventional software engineering practices OO methods must have 
performance measures as well.  NASA’s Software Assurance Technology Center has 
developed nine metrics for objected oriented design and development.  Rosenberg and 
Hyatt (1997) define the following metrics in detail, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis: 
 
• Cyclomatic complexity 
• Size 
The results of these metrics during an OO 
technical risk management and
It is evident that software risk management is not much different from hardware 
risk management.  The focus must be on processes up front and early during the 
engineering/development cycle.  TPMs are excellent early indicators of potential risk and 
should be used as inputs to the risk identification process.  Although conventional 
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software development methods are being replaced by OO methods, there is still the need 
for performance measures which are linked to the technical risk management and 
assessment program.   
  
F. 
ment programs usually emphasize product and technology risks.  They do not do 
an adequate job of identifying process and programmatic risk.  This is where independent 
the gap and ensure a complete (and total) program risk 
nt.  The following statements summarize the value of risk management (and 
assessment):      
 
 process that efficiently identifies risks, assess 
risk levels, and effectively reduces or mitigates risks to achieve program goals. 
nagement & assessment approach to identify potential 
re much more cost effective to manage and 
 methodology used on many DoD and 
commercial acquisition programs. 
es, lessons learned, and engineering fundamentals, 
s rigor. 
• Applies a complete tool set of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methods to 
provide the desired level of insight for decision makers. 
• Pro
 
VALUE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
There is significant value and pay-off to implementing an effective risk 
management and assessment program supplemented with independent risk assessments.  
It ensures a complete, comprehensive, and integrated approach.  Internal risk 
manage
risk assessments help fill 
assessme
• Provides a systematic decision-making
• Provides a proactive risk ma
problems or risks early on where they a
mitigate. 
• Implements a demonstrated and proven
• Implements best industry practic
critical disciplines, and proces
vides timely insight to potential risks that could adversely affect key/critical 
program milestones if left unmitigated.   
• Assesses the risk of new technologies, unproven processes, and COTS/NDI selection
and use. 
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G. RISK METHODS TAUGHT AT DAU 
Formerly Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), Ft. Belvoir, VA is 
home to the Defense A
an
cquisition University (DAU).  DAU provides acquisition training 
d certification to both military and civilian members of the acquisition workforce.  
des and maintains the Defense Acquisition 
Deskbo
plates and a best practices strategy.  The Product approach is based on 
the WB  and the resultant product decomposition where the risk events that might have a 
qua
level.  DAU recommends the 5 X 5 Matrix Method.  The overall risk level is determined 
ches the Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis 
oth  in the Total Program Risk Model is not 
As with NAVSO P-3686, the Guide advocates a risk management organization 
with the risk manager reporting directly to the program manager.  It also recommends the 
use of independent risk assessors reporting to the program manager.      
DAU also publishes many DoD acquisition gui
ok, which is a complete acquisition knowledge information system and reference 
library available on the web and compact disc.   
DAU has published for five years now a Risk Management Guide For DoD 
Acquisition.  The latest (5th) edition was released in June of 2002.  The risk methods 
contained in this Guide are taught at DAU.  They focus on an Integrated Product and 
Process approach to risk management and assessment similar to the guidance in NAVSO 
P-3686, which is also referenced in this Guide.  The Process approach is based on the 
Willoughby Tem
S
negative impact on the system, subsystem, or components as defined by the WBS are 
evaluated (DAU, 2002, p. 57).  Both the Process and Product based approaches are 
litative in nature and require a subjective classification method to arrive at a risk 
by the intersection of the probability of occurrence and consequence of occurrence 
values.    
With this Guide DAU also tea
techniques which utilize a Monte Carlo simulation on the WBS and project schedule.  
These are considered quantitative methods and are not addressed NAVSO P-3686.  The 
er quantitative method, PRA, described
discussed in either the Guide or NAVSO P-3686.     
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Software risk management is briefly mentioned in the Guide, and it takes a best 
practice
d assessment techniques.  They provide 
good c
making it a key component of their systems engineering technical review process.  
NAVAIR has a technical process review manual that requires that technical risk 
assessments be conducted prior to technical design reviews and major milestones 
through
NAVAIR’s recent focus is on standardization of risk management methods.  
Every PEO seems to do risk management and assessment differently.  Many use the  
5 X 5 
isks are managed 
or watched by the IPTs.  Some PEOs and program offices (PMAs) promote a risk 
s approach.  The guide makes no distinction between the management of software 
and hardware risk.  The process is the same.  The Guide provides three best practices 
methods for software risk management taken from an Air Force guide.    (DAU, 2002, pp. 
88-92) 
Overall, DAU and the latest Risk Management Guide provide a good 
comprehensive overview of risk management an
overage of qualitative and quantitative techniques including software.  It is 
recommended that in future guidance and updates to the Guide that PRA methods be 
discussed.  In addition, classes devoted and dedicated to risk management and assessment 
techniques should be offered through the DAU curriculum.  Often risk management is 
offered as simply a short module in another curriculum.  It is recommended that separate 
risk management and assessment classes be established.   
 
H. TECHNICAL RISK MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE SYSCOMS 
1. NAVAIR 
NAVAIR has institutionalized the requirement for technical risk management by 
out the life cycle (CAPT M. Patterson, personal communication, August 9, 2002).  
This amounts to approximately 12 required technical risk assessments throughout the 
systems engineering process/life cycle for a typical NAVAIR acquisition program.   
Matrix Method tailored specifically for each program.  Most programs have risk 
review boards that meet monthly to discuss risk identification and mitigation status.  
High-level risks are generally managed at the program level, and Low r
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awaren
standard classification and reporting formats.  The standard classification format 
will be
ineering qualification process 
curriculum to include an 8-hour module on technical risk management.  Currently, only 
re training 
on tech      
e for 
a comm
ess culture with full, open, and honest communication of risk status.  Others do 
not like to disclose High risk (red) areas.  In an effort to standardize across the PEOs, 
NAVAIR is currently working on a draft risk management instruction and handbook.  
This instruction will require that all programs have a risk management program and 
provide 
 the 5 X 5 probability of occurrence versus consequence matrix.  NAVSO P-3686 
is being used as a guide to develop this standard risk management process.   
NAVAIR already has an instruction for system and safety risk management.  
System and safety risks are automatically escalated to the program manager for 
management.  Probabilistic methods (e.g., fault tree, event tree, etc.) are used as inputs to 
the technical risk management and assessment program and are rolled up into the 5 X 5 
Matrix for classification.   
NAVAIR will soon supplement its systems eng
about an hour of risk training is offered.  NAVAIR realizes they need to do mo
nical risk management. 
 
2. NAVSEA 
NAVSEA lacks an overarching policy statement or instruction for risk 
management.  As a result, some of the PEOs have issued internal instructions and 
guidance on risk management methods.  For instance, Program Executive Office for 
Theater Surface Combatants (PEO TSC) has published an instruction on risk 
management (PEOTSCINST 3058.1).  This instruction provides policy and guidanc
on risk management process for all PEO TSC programs (PEOTSC, 2000, p. 1).  It 
focuses on qualitative risk assessment techniques only and requires the use of the 5 X 5 
Matrix Method to classify risk.  The instruction mandates the use of TRIMS and Risk 
Radar as the common toolset and risk database.  TRIMS provides an identification, 
mitigation, tracking, and reporting tool for process-based risk.  Risk Radar provides a 
Microsoft Access based risk database for tracking product and software risks.  PEO TSC 
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is commended for attempting to standardize risk management approaches for all its 
programs resulting from the lack of policy from NAVSEA.  However, they have not yet 
considered the value of quantitative methods.  This is no different than what most 
NAVSEA programs have done concerning quantitative risk management and assessment 
methods.   
An interview with two high-level risk management professionals within the 
NAVSEA organization who wish to remain anonymous has substantiated what this 
author 
 PRA are not being used within the NAVSEA community.   
around a particular product or piece of hardware.  
Therefore, it is only natural for IPT members to focus on hardware (product) specific 
risk.   seen from NAVSO P-3686, the most effective risk 
management and assessment program is an Integrated Product and Process based 
approach.  Process risks should be identified early during design and development to 
ensure the proper engineering disciplines are being applied.  Because the contractor(s) 
most always focus on Product risk, Navy program managers sometimes hire independent 
risk assessment teams from the field activities to assess the Process risk on the program.  
management organization reporting directly to the Risk Management Coordinator.  
Unfortunately, the independent teams are often called in much too late in the life cycle, 
source selection process to ensure the prospective contractors have the proper 
has suspected for a long time.  NAVSEA acquisition programs primarily focus on 
the identification and mitigation of Product risks.  In other words, they do not focus on 
the process-based risk early in the life-cycle which has proven to lead to Product risk.  
The interviewees indicated that in general quantitative methods, such as Cost and 
Schedule Risk Analysis and
Why the primary focus on Product risks?  The answer lies in who is identifying a 
majority of risks on a program.  Program IPTs are tasked in many cases with identifying 
risk.  These IPTs are usually chaired by the contractor and are inherently product based.  
This means the IPT is formed 
However, as we have
NAVSO P-3686 (1998, p. 8) recommends independent risk assessors be part of the risk 
generally during EMD, to support the MS III production decision.   
The use of independent risk assessors is rare within NAVSEA.  In contrast, some 
SPAWAR program managers use independent risk assessment teams as early as the 
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engineering disciplines in place to avoid risk.  These program managers retain the 
services of their independent risk assessment teams throughout the life cycle to conduct 
risk assessment snapshots on the selected contractor/activity.  Independent risk 
assessment teams conduct process-based assessments and the contractor(s) conducts 
product-based assessments.  Both teams share the same risk database and are fully 
engage
thority.  It seems that 
many N
d in the status of all identified risks.  Representatives from both teams participate 
in a monthly risk review board to discuss risk identification and mitigation status.   
The use of the 5 X 5 Matrix Method and the overall risk level cube tailored by 
each program office are the predominate methods used on NAVSEA programs.  These 
methods provide for a quick and easy technique for assigning risk levels, albeit subjective 
in nature.  There are also variants of the 5 X 5 method being used by others.  Raytheon 
Missile Systems in Tucson uses a 10 X 10 matrix, which is shown in Appendix B. 
The lack of quantitative methods within NAVSEA has already been discussed, 
but one interviewee believes PRA methods should not be done by independent risk 
teams, but only by contractor design and systems experts.  The interviewee is a Risk 
Manager for a NAVSEA ACAT I program.  Independent risk assessment teams should 
ideally focus on qualitative, process based methods because they are most often missing 
in a contractor’s risk management program.  Contractors should be doing PRA as part of 
the design and development process because it is an extension of the FMEA process.  
Conducting “what if” analysis to determine the probability of failure and associated 
consequence in quantitative form is inherently part of the design and systems engineering 
process.                   
What is the feeling of our risk experts on the risk culture within NAVSEA?  One 
interviewee felt that many programs claim to do continuous risk assessment, however 
they really only do periodic assessments just prior to a major milestone to achieve a 
check in the box.  In other cases, they only care about risk when it comes time to submit a 
periodic acquisition program status report to a milestone decision au
AVSEA risk management programs actually track problems not risks.  They are 
practicing problem management not risk management.  This means the risk has already 
occurred (probability is 100%), so it is a problem, which needs corrective action.  It 
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doesn’t get management attention until the risk has occurred, and it is now a problem 
impacting the program that needs to be dealt with.  Everyone “talks-the-talk,” that is, they 
pay lip service to the risk management policy from DoD and SECNAV, but when it 
comes right down to it they don’t “walk-the-talk” or execute the intent of the policy and 
associated guidance.     
A sure sign of the level of attention given to risk management within an 
acquisition program is the status of the risk manager.  NAVSO P-3686 (1998, p. 7) states,  
Within NAVSEA acquisition programs the status of the risk manager is questionable and 
inconsistent.  There is rarely a risk manager with power.  One risk manager interviewed 
by this author indicated that he rarely gets any feedback at all from the program manager 
n the contrary, contractors should be encouraged and incentivized to 
identify risks, but this has not occurred within NAVSEA.  A “shoot the messenger” 
friendly environment with their actions and treatment of those who report program risk, it 
will be difficult to change the risk culture.   
The key to establishing an effective risk organization is to formally assign 
and empower an individual whose primary role is managing risk.  This 
individual, referred to as the Risk Management Coordinator, should be a 
higher-level program office person, such as the Deputy Program Manager 
(DPM), and should be accountable directly to the PM for all aspects of the 
risk program.  The Risk Management Coordinator must have a level of 
authority which provides direct, unencumbered access to the PM and can 
cross organizational lines. 
 
on his risk reports.     
For the most part, there is not a risk friendly culture within NAVSEA.  Programs 
want to know their risks, but they don’t desire visibility of their risks outside of their 
program.  Contractors also don’t want to identify high risks for fear of program schedule 
or funding delays.  O
culture is still present.  Until the high-level decision makers make a point to instill a risk 
Both interviewees thought that more risk management and assessment training 
was needed in the NAVSEA community.  Training should consist of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods.  They seemed to be in agreement that for quantitative methods, 
Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis should be the primary focus prior to PRA methods.  
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Training should be conducted jointly with contractor and government personnel in the 
same class.  This will ensure the development of a common language and understanding 
of the risk methodologies and application strategies for the acquisition program.  Both 
interviewees were advocates of a single risk management process and a joint 






with ris oblem 
manage agement.  He believes NAVSEA needs to release a 
structured policy statement with guidance on risk management to the community.  He 
recommends a similar approach to what NAVAIR has done, making risk management 
and assessment inherently part of the systems engineering technical review process.  The 
other interviewee believes NAVSEA needs to continue moving forward and empower 
everyone in the community to identify and report risk.  NAVSEA needs to instill a risk 
friendly
      
3. SPAWAR 
 will be modeled after the risk management 
approach PMW 189, Naval Electronic Combat Surveillance, has implemented across its 
5 progr
premier organization within SPAWAR, not only for risk management, but also for 
software best practices, earned value management, and high performance organization.  
wee said there are over half a dozen risk databases on his program and none of 
them can talk to each other.  A single, unified risk database should be the norm.   
When asked about sources of risk management training, both intervi
ended DAU and NSWC Corona Division.  Both activities have been tra
tion professionals for a number of years.     
Finally, the interviewees were asked where they thought NAVSEA was 
k management.    One thought NAVSEA was headed down the path of pr
ment instead of risk man
 culture so individuals will identify and report risk without risk of reprisal.    
SPAWAR lacks an overarching policy statement or instruction for risk 
management.  SPAWAR is currently working on adopting a standard process for risk 
management across the PMWs (program offices), which will be released as a policy or 
guidance document.  The standard process
ams.  PMW 189 is considered a leader for risk management application and is a 
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PMW 189 is part of the PD 18 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Directorate which has two other PMWs that are risk management advocates and 
practitioners --  PMW 182, Mobile Surveillance Systems (SURTASS), and PMW 183, 
Advanced Deployable Systems (ADS).  The ADS Program participated in 
ASN(RD&A)ABM’s Risk Management Survey of 1997 ((ASN(RD&A)ABM, 1997, p. 
2).  Both the ADS Program (PMW 183) and the Deputy Program Manager for PMW 189 
(when he worked for PMW 163) contributed to the guidance in NAVSO P-3686 
(NAVS
risk 
management and assessment efforts.     
aspect of a successful risk management approach.  Both 
the Navy and contractor Risk Officers take a week long risk management class where 
they attend in joint session in order to arrive at a common understanding of the risk 
of the program community in joint fashion as well.  Risk management training is not a 
one-time occurrence, but should continue periodically to reinforce risk management 
contractor performed effective risk management, then at least 25% of the award fee had 
O P-3686, 1998, p. v).  SPAWAR boasts clear leaders in the risk management 
arena.  Let’s examine what PMW 189 has done to make themselves a model for all other 
program offices.   
The Deputy Program Manager for PMW 189 was interviewed to discuss his very 
successful approach to risk management (F. Doherty, personal communication, August 
26, 2002).  The two most critical elements required to establish and sustain a successful 
risk management program is leadership and training.  Good leadership is required to 
continually drive the risk efforts and provide constant reinforcement to prevent the risk 
program from atrophying.  It all starts at the top with the PM.  The first key to success is 
the PM must support risk management.  PMW 189 assigns dedicated Risk Officers within 
each of its programs, support centers, and contractors.  It is their job to provide this 
leadership.  Risk Officers must have a questioning mind to drive and sustain 
Training is another key 
management language and process.  A 3-day risk management course is given to the rest 
functions and to refine, improve, and evolve risk methods.   
PMW 189 has also experimented with contract incentives for using risk 
management.  In one contract they put in the contractor’s award fee a clause stating if the 
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to be shared with all the employees in the company.  This was great way of incentivizing 
the entire company workforce to identify and mitigate risks.  There was no hiding of risks 
here!  The success of this incentive structure serves as a model for other programs to use. 
PMW 189 considers risk management a key program manager responsibility.  As 
a result, the PMs and Risk Officers have risk management performance criteria in their 
performance appraisals.  The contractors also rate the performance of their PMs on risk 
management and assessment effectiveness.  Openly declaring a risk is good, and hiding a 
risk is bad.  A no surprises approach is rewarded.  Those PMs and Risk Officers that 
don’t take risk management and assessment seriously are penalized.   
As NAVAIR has done, PMW 189 has made risk reporting a key focus of all 
program
Qualitative risk assessment methods are used primarily by PMW 189.  They use 
templates or best practices approach (except for software risk).  They believe people will 
find the best practices through innovation and discipline.  They assess all types of risk 
including software, hardware, and process related risk.  Their software risk assessment 
approa
hen, like NAVAIR, they use 
the ou
 and baseline reviews.  They use the stoplight, color-coded approach to present 
the risks with supporting details.  Weekly risk updates are provided to the PMs with a 
monthly in-depth review.  Risk Radar is used to catalog the risks.   Thus, PMW 189 has 
fully institutionalized the risk management process within the acquisition life-cycle, the 
systems engineering process, and the program management discipline 
informal methods based on expert opinion and some check sheets.  They don’t use a 
ch is based on software best practices.  They have very clear definitions for risk, 
and they use the 5 X 5 Matrix Method to classify risk.  They are advocates of keeping the 
risk assessment and classification process simple or people won’t use it.  This is the 
reason why they like the 5 X 5 Matrix Method.  They do very little quantitative risk 
assessment.  Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis using Monte Carlo simulations are not 
used.  One PRA method using fault tree analysis is used to some extent to drill down to a 
level where the risk can be assessed more appropriately.  T
tput from PRA as an input to a qualitative assessment.  This is not a pure 
application of PRA as NASA uses it, but a good start.               
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PMW 189 has effectively implemented risk management and assessment.  A 
constant focus on risk assessment driven by strong leadership and a good understanding 
of risk by the community resulting from frequent training has been the key.  This 
diligen
cument using their 
methods.   
IONS 
• They use modern tools and are not disdainful of sophisticated and proven approaches. 
ce saved one program helping it pass OPEVAL.  The success of PMW 189 has not 
gone unnoticed.  Other PMWs have asked for assistance in setting up risk management 
and assessment programs.  Some contractors have come to PMW 189 asking for 
independent risk assessments because of their knowledge in this area.  Finally, SPAWAR 
has recognized PMW 189 as a model for the entire organization and is in the process of 
writing a risk management and assessment policy and guidance do
The jury is still out concerning where SPAWAR is heading with risk 
management.  There are some pockets of success, but it has not been institutionalized 
across the SYSCOM.   
   
I. CHARACTERISITICS OF RISK MATURE ORGANIZAT
How does an organization know when it has reached a level of risk maturity 
comparable to today’s world-class risk management leaders?  Hullet (2001, p. 7) provides 
a list of key characteristics, which are worthy of repeating here: 
   
• Organizational culture is “risk friendly.” 
• Risk management gains priority to rank along with cost, time, and scope 
management. 
• Decisions are made and resources are allocated based on the results of risk analysis. 
• The highest quality data are used for risk analysis and resources are committed to the 
efforts. 
• Risk management is viewed as a career path in the organization even though that may 
make it hard to “control.” 
• Mature risk management organizations look to the best in class to benchmark their 
risk management processes. 
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• The
vel of risk maturity.  Why?  Risk management is viewed as an important part 
of proje
 as PRA, and is continuing to develop and hone probabilistic 
methods.  There appears to be a “risk friendly” culture within NASA; however, within 
the Navy there is still a risk-hiding culture for fear of surfacing bad news.   
y measure their effectiveness with metrics. 
• Project decisions are made on a “risk-adjusted” basis. 
• Continuous improvement is achieved through regular repetition. 
• They participate in professional interchanges through conferences and journals 
sharing what they have learned. 
 
Using these key characteristics as benchmarks, it is evident based on the results of 
this Survey and interviews with key risk professionals within the SYSCOMs that the 
Navy has not yet reached a high-level of risk maturity.  In contrast, NASA seems to have 
reached a le
ct management and the status and rank of risk management responsibility is equal 
to that of program management.  NASA utilizes modern risk management and 
assessment tools, such
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III.  TECHNICAL RISK MANAGEMENT SURVEY  
 
 with it a major change in how the acquisition 
community views risk.  ASN(RD&A)ABM’s survey of Navy program managers in 1997 
revealed an increased awareness of technical risk; however, risk management and 
assessment methods were not common, nor completely institutionalized throughout Navy 
programs.  The results of this survey led to the publication NAVSO P-3686, Top Eleven 
Ways to Manage Technical Risk, a comprehensive technical risk management guidance 
manual in 1998 by ASN(RD&A)ABM.  NAVSO P-3686 was written for program 
managers and other acquisition professionals to provide a common, best practice 
approach to technical risk management and to address the deficiencies noted in the 1997 
survey.   
ilable to the 
acquisition community for nearly 4 years via many sources including the Defense 
Acquisition Deskbook, ASN(RD&A)ABM’s Web Site, Defense Contract Management 
Agency’s Web Site, and DAU.  A primary objective of this thesis is to determine if  
NAVSO P-3686 is being used by Navy programs to establish technical risk management 
functions.  As part of this thesis research, a Survey was conducted of program managers 
and other acquisition professionals to determine their attitudes towards technical risk, the 
methods and techniques being used, and guidance documents used to establish their 
technical risk management and assessment programs.  The Survey specifically examined 
if NAVSO P-3686 was being used.   
 
B. THE SURVEY  
The Technical Risk Management Survey consisted of 30 questions, with roughly 
one half of the questions using a 5-point Likert scale.  The other half were Yes/No and 
open-ended fill in the blank type of questions.  The Likert technique is based on a set of 
attitude statements.  Respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement with 
A. WHY SURVEY?  
Acquisition reform brought
Now that NAVSO P-3686 has been widely publicized and ava
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a statemen ce egree of 
agreement is assigned a numerical value from one to five.  (“The Likert scale,” n.d.,  ¶ 1)  
opy k Management Survey is provided in Appendix E.    
t con rning some aspect of risk management and assessment.  Each d
A c  of the Technical Ris
In order to maximize the probability of the Survey being completed and returned 
by respondents, an efficient and user friendly surveying method was chosen to minimize 
the impact on already busy acquisition professionals.  A web-based survey hosting tool, 
called Zoomerang (www.zoomerang.com), was selected to create and distribute the 
survey.  Zoomerang also provided the tracking of respondents and collection and 
reporting of survey results.  The Survey was recreated within Zoomerang using radio 
buttons and drop down menus to select attitude statements and Yes or No question 
responses.   Scrollable text boxes were used for the open-ended question responses.  The 
end result was a simple point and click approach to filling out the Survey using any Web 
Browser.  The estimated time to fill out the Survey was 10 to 15 minutes.  The Survey 
was prefaced with an introductory paragraph describing the purpose of the Survey, 
followed by the 30 questions.  After completing the Survey and clicking the “Send” 
button, a thank-you page appeared with the author’s name and phone number.  
Respondents who would like to see a copy of the Survey results were encouraged to call 
the author and request a copy of the thesis.    
ary from each of the three SYSCOMs (NAVSEA, 
NAVAIR, and SPAWAR).  In addition, since risk management and assessment functions 
to support contractors or led by prime contractors, a sample of 
contractor personnel was also surveyed.   
 
C. SURVEY EXPOSURE  
In order to make suppositions about technical risk management attitudes and 
application within the Navy, a good cross section or sample of program managers and 
acquisition professionals was necess
are sometimes delegated 
Zoomerang’s primary method of launching a survey is via E-mail addresses.  The 
Technical Risk Management Survey was E-mailed to 69 invitees across the three 
SYSCOMs, including support contractors and prime contractors.  Zoomerang 
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automatically generates an E-mail with introductory text provided by the author.  After 
the introductory text, Zoomerang provides a hyperlink to the Survey, so the invitee 
simply has to click on the hyperlink within the E-mail to get to the Survey.  Zoomerang 
keeps 
inders were very useful in capturing the 
stragglers.    
D. 
 significant highlights and trends of the Survey 
will be
track of who has responded by E-mail address.  Automated weekly E-mail 
reminders are sent out to those on the initial mailing list who have not yet responded.     
Zoomerang allows the posting of a survey link on a Home Page or Web Site.  
This method was also used for the Technical Risk Management Survey to gain maximum 
exposure.  BMPCOE graciously agreed to host a hyperlink to the Survey on their Web 
Site under News & Events.  BMPCOE is a primary source of technical best practices for 
government, industry, and academia.  Their Web Site provides on-line access to over 
2,500 proven best practices including knowledge information and risk 
management/assessment tools which are also available for free download.  Thanks to 
BMPCOE, the Technical Risk Management Survey was subjected to a wide exposure.  
Appendix F shows a link to the Survey on the BMPCOE Web Site.  
The Survey was officially launched on July 15, 2002 and remained active for 35 
days until it closed on August 18, 2002.  A majority of responses were received within 
the first 10 days, although a few respondents replied during the last two days of the active 
window.  The weekly-automated E-mail rem
 
SURVEY RESULTS  
A total of 69 invitations were sent to program managers and other acquisition 
professionals across the three SYSCOMs.  Over the course of the 35-day active window, 
there were 38 respondents for a response rate of 55%.  This is much better than the 
average response rate of 36.83% to E-mail surveys over a 15-year period (1986-2000) as 
reported by Sheehan (2001, Results).  The
 summarized in the following paragraphs.  A complete copy of the survey results is 
contained in Appendix G. 
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 1. Experience Levels of Respondents 
The Survey asked a few questions concerning the experience levels of the 
respondents.  The results were positive.  The Survey respondents were very experienced 
in systems acquisition and support.  Almost all of them were certified to a DAWIA 
Career
R, 4 with SPAWAR, 
1 with 
 A good cross section of acquisition professionals was surveyed across the Navy 
SYSCOMs and supporting organizations.  Of the 38 respondents, 42% were affiliated 
R, 21% with NAVAIR, and 26% were classified as 
“Other
 Field with the most frequent being Level III Program Management (PM), 
followed by Level III Systems Planning, Research, Development, and Engineering 
(SPRDE), and finally a few Level II and III Production, Quality and Manufacturing 
(PQM) categories.  The respondents averaged 16 years of acquisition experience and 10 
years of risk management experience.   Of the 38 total respondents, 10 indicated a title or 
position of program manager and 5 could be considered risk managers.  The remaining 
23 were acquisition professionals working within program offices, for prime contractors, 
or supporting field activities and contractors.  Of the 10 respondents identified as 
program managers, 3 were affiliated with NAVSEA, 1 with NAVAI
a prime contractor, and 1 unknown (could not be traced).  Of the 5 identified as 
risk managers, 2 were affiliated with NAVSEA, 2 with NAVAIR, and 1 with SPAWAR.   
  
2. Respondent Affiliation 
with NAVSEA, 24% with SPAWA
.”  The “Other” category included prime contractors, subcontractors, and program 
office support contractors.  The NAVSEA response was approximately twice that of the 
other SYSCOMs because most of the field activity respondents were affiliated with 
NAVSEA.      
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 3. Technical Risk Management Attitudes 
Acquisition reform initiated a change from a risk avoidance culture to a risk 
management culture.  Risk management became a key component of program 
management and a key tool for the program manager’s tool kit.  When asked if the 
respondents believed technical risk management was a key component of program 
management, 71% Strongly Agreed with this statement.  The remaining 29% Agreed 
with this statement, which left no respondents selecting the Neutral or Disagree attitudes.  
These r  certainly understand the value of technical 
risk ma
 Not Useful.  Quantitative methods, such as PRA and Monte Carlo 
simulations, were rated somewhat lower with 26% rating them Very Useful, 13% 
Extremely Useful, and 5% Not Useful.  However, the middle categories of Useful and 
Somewhat Useful rated higher for the quantitative methods.  These results substantiate 
the contention that qualitative methods are the predominate technical risk assessment 
A number of Survey questions dealt with respondent’s attitudes towards technical 
risk management and associated methods.  Survey questions # 1-6, # 10-11, # 16, and  
# 28 are grouped under this category.   
When asked about the importance of technical risk management to the success of 
a program, 100% of the respondents rated it Important or higher.  55% rated it Extremely 
Important and 37% said it was Very Important.  These results substantiate one of the 
conclusions of ASN(RD&A)ABM’s 1997  Risk Management Survey which said that 
there was an increasing awareness within the Navy community concerning technical risk.  
Without a doubt, this is certainly true today and supported by the Survey results.   
esults indicate that program managers
nagement, and it should be part of their program planning and execution.   
The next series of questions asked the respondents how they felt about the 
effectiveness of the qualitative and quantitative technical risk management methods 
describe previously in this thesis.  Qualitative methods based on a Willoughby Templates 
and best practices approach were rated Very Useful by 50% of the respondents.  Only 
18% rated these methods as Extremely Useful, 21% said they were only Useful, and 0% 
said they were
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methods within the Navy today.  It is encouraging to note that respondents must be aware 
of quan t Know category. 
anages or minimizes technical risk.  61% of the 
respondents said absolutely and Strongly Agreed.  34% Agreed and surprisingly 5% 
responded with Neutral.  Fortunately no one Disagreed with this statement.  With many 
of the respondents certified to the DAWIA Level III SPRDE and PM categories, it is 
surprising that there was not a more overwhelming majority for Strongly Agree.  This 
thesis has made the contention that there really is no difference between the critical 
disciplines.  In fact, technical risk assessment should be used to measure how effectively 
the sys
This discussion on best practices and critical engineering processes is a good lead 
in to another related Survey question, which asked if systematic and proactive 
identification and correction of faulty processes would reduce the occurrence of 
downstream acquisition problems.  50% of the respondents Agreed that a proactive 
correction of faulty processes would indeed prevent future problems from occurring.  
47% Strongly Agreed with this statement.  These results indicate that acquisition 
profess
For years the biggest argument from program managers is “show me my savings 
from my up front investment in risk management before I commit to an aggressive risk 
titative methods because no one selected the Don’
In an effort to determine if respondents believed there is a correlation between 
systems engineering and technical risk management one Survey question asked if a 
systems engineering approach better m
engineering processes outline in a risk templates approach and the systems engineering 
tems engineering disciplines have been implemented.  The variance between 
current practice and best practice determines the risk level.   
ionals do understand the importance of early identification and mitigation of 
process based risk.  A key theme in this thesis is unmitigated Process risk leads to 
Product risk.  The question remains why do many acquisition programs not implement 
proactive and aggressive risk management programs if they understand the benefits of 
early identification and mitigation?  The answer may lie in reduced budgets, the difficulty 
in quantifying the downstream savings of early investment in risk management and 
assessment, and a lack of incentives to apply risk management and assessment 
techniques.          
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program.”  It is not easy to quantify the savings from a risk management program.  
Intuitively we know if risks are identified and mitigated early, future problems are 
avoided
The fou
A good topic for further study would be to develop a model for program managers to use 
to quantify the cost savings from their risk management program. 
a source of workload.  11% Strongly Disagreed.  However, surprisingly 
26% of the respondents Agreed that risk management was a source of workload with 5% 
Strongly Agreeing.  13% were on the fence with Neutral.  Thus, nearly one-third of all 
.  It is difficult to estimate the cost of a future problem, plus it takes time that 
many do not have to perform the estimates, if it can be done at all.  The Survey asked the 
respondents to estimate the savings from their risk management programs to see what 
kind of responses would be obtained.  As suspected, the respondents had significant 
difficulty with this question.  Of the 24 who responded, 20 could not provide an estimate.  
Here is what some had to say: 
 
• “Savings a Risk Management Program provides cannot be measured.”   
• “Savings are hard to pin down – the success of the program is the only real metric 
that gets high visibility with me.” 
• “That is too hard.  It’s cost avoidance and grief avoidance.” 
 
r that did respond had the following to say: 
 
• “This is hard.  I’d say $2 to $3M/year for technical risks.  It could be much, much 
higher for the tactical risks (say an order of magnitude).” 
• “Impossible to calculate savings, but I would guess on the order of 10-25% of 
total acquisition cost.” 
• “100K-$500K (ROM).” 
• “$400-500K.” 
 
Respondents were asked if they perceived risk management as a source of 
workload instead of part of the acquisition solution.  45% Disagreed that risk 
management was 
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respondents believe risk management is simply a workload task.  If you throw in the non-
committals you are approaching 45%.  This is a surprising result considering 100% of the 
respondents believed technical risk management was Important or better (Very or 
Extremely Important) to the success of an acquisition program.  This can be interpreted 
as they think technical risk management is important, but they don’t like doing it, perhaps 
because it is not easy.      
Finally, attitudes towards specific features of a technical risk management 
program were surveyed.  One of the NAVSEA risk professionals interviewed as part of 
this re  there were over half a dozen individual risk management 
data s n order to 
roll
consoli good example of why a single joint program 
offi /c  recommended.  It is 
portant that the entire program community speak the same language and share the risk 
tion asked how important is a single 
sk management program and database for an acquisition program.  32% responded 
Extrem
3% said
mit t d into the WBS/Project Schedule.  32% Strongly Agreed 
that they should be fed back into WBS/Project Schedule, 34% Agreed, 21% were 
eutral, 11% Disagreed, and 3% Strongly Disagreed.  What is surprising is that 14% of 
the respondents Disagreed that risk mitigation plans should be factored into the project 
schedule.  This is often the reason why risk management programs are ineffective.  If risk 
mitigation plans and resources are not properly planned for by incorporating them into 
the pro
search indicated
ba es on his program.  None of the databases could talk to one another and i
 up total risk on the program, reports from each database had to be prepared and 
dated into one report.  This is a 
ce ontractor risk management program and database is highly
im
management process.  As a result, one Survey ques
ri
ely Important, 39% said Very Important, and 24% rated them Important.  Only 
 they were Not Important.   
The other feature of a risk management program surveyed was whether or not risk 
iga ion plans should be loade
N
ject schedule, then mitigation doesn’t get budgeted or implemented.  This is a 
significant oversight by nearly 15% of the programs surveyed and may be the root cause 
of their dissatisfaction with their risk management programs (see paragraph 10).       
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 4. Acquisition Reform Impact on Technical Risk Management  
This thesis has discussed in depth the impact acquisition reform has had on 
technical risk management attitudes, policies, and methods.  Survey questions # 7-9 are 
grouped under this category.   
We asked a simple question.  Did acquisition reform increase the need for 
8% were Neutral.  Surprisingly, 8% Disagreed and 5% Strongly Disagreed with this 
statement.     
see that 32% Strongly Agreed, and 30% Agreed.  
Howev
This thesis has established the importance of a disciplined approach to software 
development.  Because software engineering needs a disciplined process, a process-based 
technical risk assessment strategy is necessary to measure how well software engineering 
disciplines have been implemented.  Ineffective process-based risk assessment on the 
technical risk management?  55% Strongly Agreed with this statement, 24% Agreed, and 
Acquisition reform brought with it a change in the risk culture which resulted in 
an evolution of risk methods.  The Survey asked respondents if they thought technical 
risk management methods & techniques have changed drastically in the last 15 years.  
32% Agreed with this statement, but 26% said they Did Not Know.  16% Strongly 
Agreed, 18% were Neutral, and 8% Disagreed.   
The Survey asked each respondent if they believed there was a risk awareness 
culture within their program office where program risks are identified and openly 
discussed.  It was encouraging to 
er, 22% were Neutral, 14% Disagreed, and 3% Strongly Disagreed.  Thus, 17% 
said there is not a “risk friendly” culture within their program office.  Adding in the 
neutrals, that’s nearly 40%!  These results substantiate what the SYSCOM interviewees 
described in their interviews that there are program offices where risks are not openly 
discussed.        
 
5. Software Risk Management Methods  
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software engineering process will lead to software Product risk.  The Survey asked two 
questio sso  # 12 and 
# 13 are grouped under this category.   
us, nearly one third of program offices are not measuring 
the performance of software development.  Nearly all programs today use software 
products, so this oversight is critical.  The respondents were then asked what software 
risk management methods they used.  The responses were varied from software metrics 
to checklists.   There were a number of TPM responses which included standard software 




rveyed don’t even apply software risk management methods.         
    
  
Risk.  Survey questions # 14, # 15, # 25-27 are grouped under this category.   
ns a ciated with software risk management attitudes.  Survey questions
First of all, respondents were asked if their risk program included software.  69% 
said Yes and 31% said No.  Th
l usage, function points, etc.  The types of checklists used also varied from the 
Willoughby Templates, TRIMS, and best practices to the Software Program Manager’s 
Network (SPMN) 16 Critical Software Practices and internally created program 
checklists.  One respondent created checklists tied to the systems engineering technical 
reviews (e.g., SRR, SFR, PDR, CDR, PRR, etc.).  Another used DoD’s PM Gu
re Acquisition Best Practices.  One respondent utilized an independent software 
engineering team and another conducted a software fault tree analysis.  Surprisingly, only 
one respondent mentioned the use SEI’s SW-CMM.  Many also mentioned the use of 
Risk Radar, which is a risk management database tool that helps program managers to 
identify, prioritize, and report program risks in a user friendly format (SPMN, n.d., ¶1).  
The Survey results show that there are pockets of software risk management occurring, 
but most is based on qualitative approaches with few quantitative metrics.  Nearly one 
third of those su
  
6. Technical Risk Management Guidance
One of the objectives of this Survey was to determine what guidance documents 
for technical risk management are being used within the Navy acquisition community.  
Of particular interest was how often programs were using the Navy’s premier guidance 
document on technical risk, NAVSO P-3686, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical 
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One question addressed NAVSO P-3686 directly and asked the respondents if 
they were using this document as guidance for their risk management programs.  The 




id Not Know.  When asked how many have used DoD 4245.7-M (Willoughby 
Templates), NAVSO P-6071 Best Practices, or Methods & Metrics for Product Success 
as guidance for risk management, 44% said Yes and 28% said No.  Once again, 28% said 
they Did Not Know.  The results indicate that more respondents are familiar with the 
Willoughby Templates than NAVSO P-3686.  As we have discussed previously,  
NAVSO P-3686 is a culmination of all previous Navy technical risk management 
guidance including the Willoughby Templates.  The difference may simply be attributed 
to the fact that the Templates have been around for 17 years and NAVSO P-3686 only 
four years.   
In another survey question respondents were asked to list the technical risk 
management guidance documents they are familiar with and using on their programs.  
The following documents provide a sample of the responses: 
 
• NAVSO P-3686, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk 
• BMP Guides 
• DoD 4245.7M (Willoughby Templates) 
• TRIMS 
• NAVSO P-6071, Best Practices 
• Methods & Metrics for Product Success 
• DoD 5000.1, DoD 5000.2, DoD 5000.2R 
• 
• DAU Risk Management Guide for DoD Acq
• FAR 
• Defense Acquisition Deskbook 
• NAVAIR instructions, handbook materials, and checklists 
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In a related question, respondents were asked what risk management documents 
are being used by their contractors.  Many said they were not sure or simply said various 
documents.  Some said they used their own internal policy.  Others said they use the same 
documents as the Navy program office.  The surprising trend is that approximately 70% 
of the respondents had no idea what risk management policy and guidance documents 
their contractors were using.  The other 30% used the same guidance documents as the 
Navy program office.   
 
7. Risk Management Policy  
Two of the three SYSCOMs, NAVSEA and SPAWAR, have apparently not 
issued any type of risk management policy statement or guidance document.  As a result, 
program managers have had to rely on higher-level policy statements from DoD and 
SECNA
The Survey asked respondents if they felt DoD, SECNAV, and NAVSEA policy 
adequately addresses risk management requirements.  43% Agreed that it was adequate, 
but 40% were Neutral on this statement, and 17% Disagreed.  No respondents Strongly 
Agreed  Stro provement 
in high vel ri
 
8. Risk Management Training  
num ance of training to the technical 
risk ma geme uped under this category.   
e Su  if they have received risk management training.  
82% of spon couraging result, but 
nearly one in five (20%) have had no training at all.  However, just because 82% said 
they ha  had raining, this doesn’t mean they don’t need 
additio  trai gement within 
SPAWAR (PMW 189) believes risk training is an on-going process.   
V.  Survey questions # 25-27 are grouped under this category.   
 or ngly Disagreed.  These results indicate that there is room for im
-le sk management policy.    
A ber of interviewees indicated the import
na nt effort.  Survey questions # 21-23 are gro
Th rvey asked respondents
 re dents said Yes with 18% saying No.  This is an en
ve some kind of risk management t
nal ning.  Recall, the model organization for risk mana
 96
The Survey asked, where was the risk management training acquired and what 
methods were taught?   DAU was the most frequently cited source of risk management 
training.  However, this training was received as part of one of their program 
management courses.  The second most frequently cited source of risk management 
training was NSWC Corona who has provided risk training and assessment services to 
various SPAWAR and NAVSEA program offices, as well as contributed to various 
ASN(RD&A) technical risk management guidance documents.  The SPAWAR 
respondents cited SPMN as a good source for risk management training. Dr. David 
Hullet’s class on Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis was referenced a few times, as well a 
Brian Willoughby’s class on BMP and TRIMS.  All but one of these sources 
predom
non-technical quantitative methods as illustrated in our Total Program Risk Model 
discussed previously in this thesis.  The most frequent methods taught were those 
actices guidance 
docume
d a clear use of PRA methods.  A SPAWAR 
respondent referenced the use of classroom training and risk management symposiums 
with th cont  addition to top management training.  The 
program office for this respondent conducted a risk identification session for all of 
SPAWAR with the SYSCOM Commander participating.  The results indicate a good 
variety of both qualitative and quantitative technical risk management methods being 
taught              
9. Risk Management Program Elements & Successes 
nder this category.   
inantly focuses on qualitative methods.  Dr. Hullet’s class examines two of the 
qualitative methods based on the Willoughby Templates and Best Pr
nts.  The TRIMS tool which is based on the Templates and best practices 
approach was also cited a number of times.  The use of 5 X 5 Matrix Method was also 
referenced frequently.  Monte Carlo Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis methods were cited 
half a dozen times.  Risk Radar and risk (fault/decision) tree analysis were referenced a 
couple of times.  One response indicate
eir ractors and Systems Centers in
by providers, however it appears that not all methods are being applied in the field.    
 
 The Survey asked respondents what were some of the key elements of their risk 
management programs.  Survey questions # 18 and # 19 are grouped u
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 The following is a sample of the responses: 
 
• “Strong government encouragement of culture open to identifying risks; 
joint government/contractor risk reviews, technical subject matter experts 
from government and university labs; TRIMS database and lessons 
learned; process rigor by asking the tailored, detailed TRIMS questions.” 
• “Systems engineering approach; all players at the same table (processes, 
contracts, logistics, engineering, test and evaluation, post IOC support, 
manufacturing, R&M, systems safety, quality, E3, survivability, software, 
etc.” 
• “On-going, iterative, and integral to management of the program.” 
• “Fostering an environment for teams to identify risk.” 
• “Our Risk Management Program is primarily an action tracking system for 
maintaining visibility of identified risks.” 
• “We have a Program Office Risk Guide document that lays out some 
guidelines for monitoring Risk on a program.  We include the contractor 
and the TDA in our Risk identification and tracking method, called our 
‘Risk Radar’.” 
• “Product/Process Production Readiness based look at potential traps by 
asking the appropriate questions.” 
• “Periodic safety reviews by WSESRB, risk assessments for flight 
clearance, and software/hardware weapon fuzing risk reviews.” 
• “Applying knowledgeable and empowered personnel to address a myriad 
of issues and challenges within programs.” 
• “Risk Radar Data Bases, and risks are reviewed at all program reviews.  
We have a risk policy and risk officers.  We have trained all our personnel 
on risk management.”   
• “Holding joint Risk ID sessions with the contractor and all Govt. support 
organizations.  One full day of our quarterly program review is dedicated 
to identifying any new risks and development of mitigation and 
contingency plans.” 
• “Risk Reviews.” 
• “Incorporation of the results from SVRs and other reviews into the risk 
management system.” 
• “Proper visibility of the risks at the SEMT level.” 
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• The Risk Radar Database; fairly rigorous Risk Identification process; 
 of risk status; bimonthly face-to-
management.” 




with th  risk 
 
e.”   
struction.”   
rior to contract award.”   
 went ahead and tested the solution.  In these cases 2 
sks (mine re-acquisition and depth localization) were 
ated, one (explosive shock) turned out to be unavoidable 
hnical.  There are too many to list in total here, but 
erhead (a risk identified 
wed body, and EMI 
susceptibility.”   
“
weekly review by APM with his team
face review of risk status with upper 
•
tools.” 
“Communication of all issues to all Risk IPTs.” 
“Process & Product based; Joint Contractor/Govt. Risk Database; IPTs are 
empowered to identify risk; Govt. and industry share the risk.”   
 
rvey respondents were asked to comment on successes they had achieved 
eir management program.  The following is a sample of the responses: 
• “Clear identification of the highest risk areas and agreement from upper 
management on mitigation efforts to pursu
• “Standardized risk reporting/assessment definitions; developed a 
NAVAIR Systems Engineering guidebook, a Systems Engineering 
Technical Risk Assessment Process Instruction, and a NAVAIR Risk 
Management In
• “We've delivered major subsystems that meet and exceed customer 
expectations.”   
• “Good tracking of overall program risk and the ability to understand 
funding priorities.”   
• “System has been effective in providing visibility of risks and tracking 
mitigation efforts.” 
• “Focus government attention on key contractual events which were key to 
meeting the program (requirements) and tailoring the SOO and Contract 
Performance Planning p
• “We've had several successes dealing with identifying Risk associated 
with new tasking that allowed us to get additional funds into our budget. 
Also, we identified several tactical Risks that we developed a proposed 
solution for and then
of the tactical ri
successfully mitig
and is now being worked into our Op. Plan for the system.  Most of our 
successes have been tec
for example, we successfully reduced processor ov
early), Electro-static discharge through the to
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• “Smooth transitions in Production Readiness for AEGIS Program 
Prime/Subcontractors.”   
“Successes have varied from program-to-program.  S• uccesses are building 
• ess by whether or not a program institutes a formal risk 
d processes for risk 
 “We have saved a number of our programs from failure.  We are also 
being led to process improvements.  We have a common lexicon across all 
or our 
handling of schedule risks without negative impact to the program or the 
funding stream.”   
• .”   
• S 
ave used it, the greater have been the benefits.”   
tured, measurable methods succeed.  Programs not 









since formulation and distribution of our risk checklists.”   
“We measure succ
management program with institutionalize
identification, analysis, reporting, and mitigation.  Several have achieved 
this.”   
•
programs.  We have linked performance appraisals to risk.”   
• “Schedules have been more realistically established that allow f
• “Avoided schedule and cost overruns.”   
“Risk management is performed at the IPT level
• “In one case, we anticipated a loss of financial support for an up-coming 
experiment, and went out to an alternative sponsor who came through with 
the funds to allow the experiment to proceed on schedule.”   
“We feel that the programs that have used TRIMS and/or the TRIM
methodology (process based Risk Management) have benefited; the more 
effectively they h
• “Varies by program observed and is dependant upon the method used. 
Programs using struc
using risk assessment fail.”   
“COTS Obsolescence risk m
match that of the program.”   
“Successful milestone decisions.”   
Risk Management Program Satisfaction  
measure of success of a risk management program is how satisfied users 
gram is truly making a positive impact.  Survey questions # 17 and # 20 
der this category.   
rvey asked respondents to what degree they were satisfied with their risk 
rogram.  The results were surprising.  Only 6% were Very Satisfied, 39% 
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were S sfied








 WBS element, but we tracked 
r how open technical 
• 
real scrutiny, lulling us into the perception 
municating the risk from one program 
roducts are used (e.g., SM-2 BLK III, 
IV, IVA, SM-3).” 
 risk management program.  
Difficult to overcome the risk hiding culture.  No one wants to hear bad 
tion to an acceptable level.  Acceptable level does not 
f risk or even reducing all risks to low.  It means the 
the PM can understand.”  
ati , and 39% were Neutral.  17% were Dissatisfied and none were Highly 
he high number Neutral r
 ge  the results they hoped to get from their risk management program.  The 
 as the respondents what results were you hoping to achieve and where did 
t with their risk management programs.  Some of the responses were 
t startling: 
 
“Still strong risk identification adverse culture at Contractor.” 
“Subcontractors continue to be a problem area.” 
“We do not predict or forestall risks.  We only track them when they 
occur.” 
• “There are schedule/cost risks in every
technical risk separately and it wasn’t always clea
risk affected overall schedule.” 
•  “We have some program managers totally bought in and others hoping it 
will go away.” 
• “I was hoping to have better buy-in from the other Government agencies, 
but I often find myself doing their risk identification.” 
“Cannot control external risks.” 
• “…we never seem to truly budget for risk mitigation/risk alternatives (i.e., 
no realistic ‘risk reserve’); also, there is always the danger of just going 
through the reviews without 
that everything is fine because we are doing risk management, when we 
can miss the obvious.  Maintaining the vigilance is a real challenge.” 
• “…most of the shortfalls is not com
to the other when similar process/p
• “Hoping to quantify cost savings due to
news.” 
• “The results hoped for was actual identification of risk, quantification of 
risk, and risk mitiga
mean elimination o
risk is manageable.” 
• “Biggest challenge is to translate the technical risk assessment into terms 
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• “Most programs we support that have risk management programs fall 
short by poorly identifying risks, failure to consider process related risks, 
and the screening or downplaying risks as they are reported up the 
management chain.” 
• “(Hoping to) identify system risks to allow decisions based on total system 
impact, versus typical situation where most powerful technical discipline 
‘gets its way’.  We still are not able to eliminate skew towards undue 
weighting of risks to pet technical areas.” 
  
ck received 
from th e ind ussed in Chapter 2.  The 
comme abou
can be addressed by proper planning.  This thesis has talked about the need to incorporate 
risk mi ation
resources are l s.  Risk identification and development of 
risk mitigation
ensure sufficie loaded.       
  
These comments and concerns support and substantiate the feedba
os ividuals interviewed within the SYSCOMs disc
nt t failure to budget for risk mitigation activities is a significant issue that 
tig  planning packages into the WBS/Integrated Master Schedule to ensure 
oaded for risk mitigation activitie
 planning packages must start at the Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) to 
nt resources are 
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IV.  CONCLUSION  
ve seen a tremendoWe ha us evolution of technical risk management and 
assessm
It started with 
the release of isition reform brought with it a 
risk culture change from risk avoidance to risk awareness and management.  Risk 
manage
practice.  The amount of variance determined 
the risk level.  Risk levels were classified (assigned) using narrative criteria that often 
differed significantly among programs.  This one-dimensional classification approach 
soon evolved into a two-dimensional 5 X 5 Matrix Method as the need arose for more 
proactive assessments of risk due to acquisition reform.  The definition of Risk was now 
comprised of two components:  probability of occurrence (likelihood) and consequence  
(impact) of occurrence.  This was an evolution from the earlier one-dimensional 
definition of risk, which focused only on impact to cost, schedule, and performance.  
Quantitative methods evolved to provide a more detailed assessment of risk and 
the probability of occurrence.  The need arose because decision makers desired more 
quantitative data to base decisions on.  There is no opportunity without risk.  Quantitative 
methods include PRA used by the nuclear power industry and NASA, and Cost & 
Schedule Risk Analysis using Monte Carlo simulations on the project schedule.  
Quantitative methods have been slow to be adopted by the Navy.  Qualitative methods 
continue to predominate.               
ent applications within the Department of the Navy over the course of 17 years.  
a renewed focus on engineering process discipline and rigor in 1985 with 
the Willoughby Templates.  In 1994, acqu
ment was now considered a key component of program management.  With the 
elimination of military standards and specifications, the Navy no longer had a collection 
of proven process, practices, and methods to implement to avoid or minimize risk.  New 
acquisition policy and declining defense budgets allowed risk taking and streamlining of 
acquisition strategies.  This increased the need for technical risk management and 
assessment to gather insight into the effectiveness of contractor processes and practices.   
Qualitative (subjective) technical risk assessment methods were used to compare 
a program or contractor practice with best 
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Although risk managem part of a program manager’s 





respondents were or will be Level III certified shortly.  Many had a Level III 
for technical risk management and assessment.   
Technical risk management is very important to the success of an acquisition 
within Navy program offices.  DAU needs to teach these methods.  The Navy 
l risk management and assessment methods should be 
used to measure how well systems engineering and associated disciplines have 
been implemented on an acquisition program. 
ent and assessment is clearly 
t been institutionalized throughout the Navy.  NAVAIR has recently developed a 
risk management instruction, but NAVSEA and SPAWAR have not.  Because there is no 
common language, many programs implement risk management differently.  
ASN (RD&A)ABM’s 1998 released of NAVSO P-3686, Top Eleven Ways to Manage 
Technical Risk, was an attempt to provide some standard guidance.  In four years it has 
made an impact, albeit slow.   
This thesis surveyed a number of program managers, risk managers, and other 
acquisition professionals within the SYSCOMs to determine their attitudes toward 
technical risk management and to see what methods and guidance documents they were 
using.  In regards to a program’s use of NAVSO P-3686, the Survey found that a little 
over one-third (36%) of respondents have used or were using this guidance document.
lowing can also be concluded based on the Survey results: 
 
• Our acquisition workforce is experienced.  Respondents averaged 16 years of 
acquisition experience and 10 years of risk management experience. 
• Our acquisition workforce is DAWIA certified.  Most of the program manager 
SPRDE secondary certification. 
• Despite the respondent’s experience and DAWIA education, there is need for 
more risk management training.  Recommend DAU create a separate course 
• 
program. 
• Technical risk management is a key component of program management. 
• Qualitative methods are used predominately within the Navy. 
• Training on quantitative methods is needed before significant use will appear 
should take a look at how NASA has institutionalized PRA methods.     
• There is a definite correlation between systems engineering and technical risk 
management.  Technica
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• Incentives for technical risk management should be included in contracts.  
Technical risk management measures of effectiveness or metrics should be 
included in a contractor’s award fee to incentivize the implementation of 
critical engineering processes and disciplines.   
• Program managers have no incentive to do technical risk management.  They 
are often judged and advance in their career by how much they reduce up 
front costs, not life-cycle costs.    
• Unmitigated Process risk leads to Product risk.   
• It is difficult to quantify the savings resulting from the implementation of 
technical risk management and assessment. 
Acquisition reform has increased the need for technical risk management. 




• olicy.   
• Program managers, risk officers, risk coordinators, and other leaders should 
have risk management in their performance appraisals.  This includes both 
Navy and contractor representatives.   
• Risk management functions are not a source of workload, but a part of the 
acquisition solution.  It may be workloaded early to avoid work later. 
• A joint program management office/contractor risk management program and 
database is recommended. 
• 
•
where program risks are identified and openly discussed.  
The results show that there are pockets of software risk managem
occurring, but most is based on qualitative approaches with few quantitative 
metrics.  Nearly one third of those surveyed don’t even apply software risk 
management methods.         
• The most popular and recognized technical risk management guidance 
documents in use within the Navy are the documents Mr. Willoughby helped 
create (DoD 4245.7-M, NAVSO P-6071, Methods & Metrics for Product 
Success).  They were cited more often than 
technical risk management guidance document, NAVSO P-3686, by a margin 
of 8%.   
• 36% of those surveyed have used or are using NAVSO P-3686. 
• Approximately 70% of the respondents had no idea what ri
policy and guidance documents their contractors were using.  The other 30% 
used the same guidance documents as the program office.   
There is room for improvement in high-level risk management p
Nearly 20% of all respondents believed current DoD, SECNAV, and 
NAVSEA risk management policy was inadequate.  Another 40% were 
Neutral on this issue.   
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• Nearly 20% of the respondents have not had any risk management training.  
This begs the question about the climate for training transfer of the 80% that 
did receive risk management training.  Why have they not applied what they 
learned? 
• DAU was cited most frequently as the provider of risk management training, 
but their risk training is not a dedicated class, but part of other classes.  
Risk management training cond• ucted in joint fashion with Navy and 
erstanding and application. 
taught by providers, however it 
• 
al indicating that respondents are not 









identification and mitigation of technical risks.  The only weaknesses lie in the 
implem munication of 
risk.  T  
contractor representatives ensures a common und
• The Survey results indicate a good variety of both qualitative and quantitative 
technical risk management methods being 
appears that not all methods are being applied in the field.                
Nearly 20% of respondents were Dissatisfied with their risk management 
program and nearly 40% were Neutr
getting the results they hoped to get from their risk management program.  
Risk mitigation planning packages must be incorporated in
WBS/Integrated Master Schedule to ensure resources are loaded for risk 
mitigation activities.  
• Risk management and assessment methods have not been f
institutionalized within the Navy SYSCOMs.  NAVSEA lags SPAWAR and 
NAVAIR considerably.   
hough there is still work to do, the Navy has made strides over the past two 
oving from a risk avoidance culture to a risk awareness culture.  Risk 
als.  Risk management is engrained within DoD and DoN policy.  The 
 of defense systems within budget, on schedule (or reduced cycle times), and 
readiness is the Navy’s objective.  This is achieved through the proactive 
entation of risk management and assessment methods and the com
his author expects aspects to improve in the future, however slowly. 
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APPENDIX A. RISK IDENTIFICATION FORM 
 
RISK I
 TRACKING NUMBER 
XXX-XXXX-DENTIFICATION FORM 
PROCESS AREA FACILITY & 
### 
RISK TITLE:  
 Category:   
Template:   Activity:   
Product:   





(Low, Moderate, or High) 
ASSESSOR 
Name:   
RISK LEVEL IDENTIFIER
(Use P(f) & C(f) Tables and R(f) M
Phone #: Rf: 
Probability of Occurrence (Pf):   
ACTIVITY POC 
Na





me:   Performance:   
Phone #:   Schedule:   
Cost:   























Name:   
Phone #:   
IPT:   
DISCLAIMER: The Risk Assessment Team does not have the authority to direct the Contractor in any way nor alter the Contractor’s 
contractual obligations.  The Contractor shall take no action unless changes are issued in writing from the Contracting Officer.  Any 
changes taken without official approval from the Contracting Officer shall be taken at the Contractor’s own risk. 
From (NSWC Corona, 2000) 
Risk Identification Form 
 
A Risk Identification Form (RIF), above, will be filled out for each risk identified during 
a risk assessment.  Completed forms provide the Activity with the assessment results of 
each risk along with a description of the risk, risk level, and rationale for the risk level.  
The Activity, in turn, will have the opportunity to provide com
 will be completed in the f
 
TRACKING NUMBER 
This field contains a risk number prefix specific to the Functional Area Team that 
e risk and a sequ umber prov
Manager.  The first set of digits should represent the Activity or Program being 
assessed.  The second set of d resent th
that identified the risk.  should be
number.  A sample is provided below for a risk identified at Tank Factory #5 by 
the Production Team. 
ACTIVITY--TEAM--NUMBE
(example:  TF5--PROD--001)  
         
Input a brief and descriptive title for the Risk.  Be as specific as possible.  A 3 to 5 
word risk title is recommended. 
 
PROCESS AREA 
This block contains the most applicable Willoughby (Risk) Template and 
Template Category that the risk issue pertains to from the Risk Templates chart.  
In some cases, multiple templates and categories are acceptable.  Example:     
Category:  Production; Template:  Defect Control. 
 
FACILITY & PRODUCT/SUBASSEMBLY 
y being evaluated and the hardware (and software) this risk write-
up applies to in the "Product" field.   
 
DATE IDENTIFIED 
Enter the date this risk was identified. 
 
This block contains the overall risk level for this risk based on the 5 X 5 Matrix 
Method and the  "Risk Ruler."  Rationale for this risk level must b d 
in the Risk Level Rationale field using criteria and words from the "Risk Ruler."  
ments on each risk and a 
Plan of Action/Mitigation Strategies & Schedule.  
  
The RIF ollowing manner: 
identified th ential tr cking na ided by the Risk 
igits should rep
t set of digits
e functional area or team 









nsible for this risk at the Activity. 
 
This block contains the documentation reviewed and personnel interviewed which 
 of the risk item.   
RISK L
 
able select a rating factor from 1 to 5 in increments of 1.0 
ntained in the Table.  The higher the number the 
ility of occurrence. 
EQUENCE OF OCCURRENCE RATING FACTORS C(f) 
ost, and Schedule.  Use the criteria contained in 
the C(f) Table to arrive at rating factor selections.  Rating factors are 
en from a range of 1 to 5 in increments of 1.0.  Denote each rating 
rm.   
 
rating to obtain the Risk 
Factor.  
 and C(f) max above and find the 
intersection of P(f) and C(f) in the Derived Risk Level Matrix (cube).  
the Risk Factor R(f) rating also known as Derived Risk Level or 
n the RIF in the Risk Level Identifiers 
Block and Derived Risk Level Block.  Values may be modified as 
 the qualitative risk criteria contained in the "Risk Ruler."    
A
This block contains the name, date, and phone number of the Assessor, the 
individual who identified this risk. 
 
ACTIVITY POINT-OF-CONTACT (POC) 
Enter the point-of-contact, the person respo
REFERENCES 
aided in the discovery
 
EVEL IDENTIFIERS 
For the identified risk enter the values for P(f), C(f), and the Derived Risk Level
(Risk Factor-- R(f)) from the tables and matrices. 
   
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE RATING FACTOR P(f) 
From the P(f) T
using the criteria co
higher the probab
   
CONS
From the C(f) Table select a rating factor for each impact parameter, i.e., 
Technical Performance, C
chos
factor selection in the applicable blocks of the risk identification fo
Then choose the largest (maximum) C(f) rating out of the three chosen for
each impact parameter.  Cost, Schedule, and Performance are equally 
weighted.  Use this largest (maximum) C(f) 
 
RISK FACTOR R(f)   
Use the selected values of P(f)
This is 




RISK DESCRIPTION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Thi tions 
pro ill clearly address deficiencies observed using 
risk statements that start with a probable cause and iterate through causes and effects 
rmance is stated.  Risk statements should be 
wri
schedule, and performance."  IN ADDITION "this is how it is being done now and 
 about the approach."  A list of recommendations should complete the 
 scope of the risk issue and to put it into 
consistent terms.  It provides for consistency among Assessors and helps to determine 
itional paragraphs and continuation forms may be added 
as n
RISK LEVEL RATIONALE 
Ent s the Activity 
rationale fo
and will pr nd 
phrases fro l paragraphs and a continuation 










RISK OWNER/INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAM (IPT) 






provide t upon 
these re r 
or equivalent can give contractual direction.   
 
 
s block will provide a description of the risk and risk mitigation recommenda
vided by the Assessor.  Assessors w
until an effect on cost, schedule, or perfo
tten in terms of "IF something happens" THEN "this is the impact on cost, 
what is wrong
risk statement.  Cause and effect diagrams are an appropriate risk analysis and 
mitigation tool, which help to narrow the
risk mitigation actions. Add
eeded. 
 
er the rationale for assigning a particular risk level.  This provide
r the risk write-up. The rationale statement(s) will address the Risk level 
ovide rationale for why the risk exists.  The Assessor will use words a
m the "Risk Ruler" criteria.  Additiona
 m
SPONSE WITH MITIGATION PLAN & SCHEDULE 
is filled out by the Activity being evaluated.  It is the Activity’s response to 
ed risk.  The Activity is responsible for identifying and documenting a
plan with schedule for the identified risk.  It must be documented or 
on the RIF.  If risk mitigation plans are large, they can be attached as a 
cument, but must be at least referenced in this block of the RIF.  




m located at the bottom of the risk form in fine print is a reminder that 
rs cannot give contractual direction to Activities.  All recommendation
d by Assessors are just that "recommendations" and if Activities ac
commendations they do so at their own risk.  Only the Contracting Office
 110





























and approach, used 
some by design agent. 
Proven technology 





and approach with  0.1 
significant design 
agent experience 
Off the shelf hdwr 













 0 No schedule
impact. 
Sc











.110 X 10 Matrix Method
Probability of Occurrence (Pf)  
HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS TESTING SOFTWARE
Theoretical design Good probability of Technology Extensive new complex s/w for 
new untested applications.based on advanced significant deficiencies in   not tested.
research. meeting requirements.
New theoretical Good probability of some Approach Extensive s/w
development, newdesign. moderate deficiencies in not tested.
meeting all requirements. approach, new language.
All new design. Moderate chance of Unimproved Extensive s/w
moderate deficiencies in design has been development, - beyond
meeting all requirements. tested. experience base.
New design to Moderate chance of Other analogous Major changes in s/w
PRODUCIBILITY







Process to industry 
Partially new 
moderately improve minor requirement items have been development approach
existing design. deficiencies. tested. and application.
Major design Some chance of minor Old design has Readily adaptable s/w requirement been tested. approach, conversion from
deficiencies. similar application,
expanded to new application. 
uld meet all Testing has Some modification of 
uirement, and exceed been done on existing s/w approach.
repackaged and/or many. existing





Processes used with 
limited experience 
Proven Manufacturing
Processes used with 
manufacturing process
change.
Redesign, significant Slight chance of minor Similar designs Extensive modification
modifications. requirement and technology and tailoring of existing
deficiencies. have been approach.
tested.
Existing proven Should meet all Limited testing Slightly modified
components, requirements with little done on approach, language
recombined or minor margin. existing conversion




Processes but with no in
house experience 
Existing Manufacturing
processes but newly 
established 
Functional hardware. Will meet all Thoroughly Minor revision and
Mods in form only. requirements, exceeding tested checkout of existing s/w.
many. hardware.
Functional hardware. Will exceed all Thoroughly Use of existing, checked 




NDI/ Off the Shelf  Items






rogram  >8 months Extensive, Program > $800K
DTC >8%
Redesign or Inadequate.
threatening alternate reqd to 
achieve
Within budgeted
DTC >4% alternatives. reduction 
lip  >3 months > $300K
DTC >3%
Adequate Minor 
karound. range. alternatives exist reduction 
stem  >2 month Minor. > $200K
DTC >2%
Many adequate Minor to none.
alternatives.
or slip,  >1 month Negligible. > $100K
DTC >1%
Many adequate No significant
ath. alternatives. impact 
  None. None. None Many adequate None. 
alternatives.
hedule Impact Cost Impact
 OBABILITY  AMOUNT PROBABILITY AMOUNT ALTERNATIVES Perform
gram  >9 months Certain, program > $900K Cannot achieve. Unaccepta
gram  >7 months Probable program > $700K
DTC >7%
No adequate Significantly 
threat backup. degraded 
gram threat  >6 months Possible prog threat DTC >6% Inferior backup. Degraded. 
gram  >5 months > $500K
DTC >5%
Several adequate Reduced. 
range. alternatives.




From (Raytheon, 1999) 
Probability of Occurrence (Pf) 
Pf Supportibility Producibility Requirements Technology Hardware Software Testing
0.9-
Support resource needs unknow
logistics characteristics (e.g.failur
mode, repair process) unknown.
Critical support resourc not availa
w complex s/w; with 





0.7- Surpport resource not fully def iend; *R & M signif icantlly below requirement
New manufacturing 
process required.
Undocumented Rqmt or 
major elements of  rqmt 
beyond scope of previous 
systems.
Newer technology; 









0.5- Moderate resource shortfalls; *R & M below requirements.
Available Manuf processes 
feasible by analogy.
Unsure of Rqmt or 
expanded Rqmt from 
previously developed 
systems.
Existing technology and  
feasibility studies.






Old design or similar 
designs have been 
tested.
0.4
0.3- Minor resource shortfalls, or minor deficiencies in *R & M 
Manufacturing processes 
have been used.
Requirement similar to 
previously developed 
systems.










Previous exp with 




Support resources dediend and 
available (people, data, equipment, 
spares) *R & M meets/exceeds 
requirements.
Proven Manufacturing 
processes used With 
significant  Experience.
Requirements well within 
the scope of previously 
developed systems. 
Proven technology and 
approach with signif icant 
design experience.
Functional h/w Mods 
in form only Minor 
usage variation.
Minor revision and 





Process Category: Near Certainty; Very Good Chance / Using An Unproven & Untried, Or No Process. There Are No Plans For Proving-In Process.  There Is Not A Strategy or Current Strategy 
Will Not Resolve This Issue. Alternatives Will Be Required With Intense (Management) Attention
Process Category: Highly Likely; Good Chance.  Using An Unproven But Tried Process.   There May Be A Partial Plan And Schedule For Prove-In.    Current Strategy Will Probably Fail To 
Resolve Issue.  Alternative Plans Will Be Required.
Process Category: Likely to Occur; Even Shot / Using A Newly Proven (Untried) Process. Current Strategy May Or May Not Resolve This Issue.     Alternative Plans May Be  equired.
Process Category: Low Likelihood; Some Chance.  Using A Proven But Unfamiliar Industry Practice. Current Strategy Should Resolve This Issue.






No capability or technology 
to produce.
Unknown Rqmt or similar 









Severity of Consequence (Cf)
Performance Impact Schedule Impact Total Cost  of Ownership  Impact 
C f Alternatives Performance Degree Of Impact Mths
1.0
No alternatives, 







>9 Certain program threat Contractor Requests More Funding, or exceeds original program 
estimates >10%




Major impact to customer 
plans >8
Major impact to 
customer costs
0.8 Redesign or alternate required
Usability 
degradation




0.7 No adequate backup Significant change from plan
Intermediate milestone 




Reserve (MR), or exceeds
original program estimate 7-10% 
0.6 Inferior backup Degraded Significant program rescheduling >5
Significant internal 
rebudgeting
0.5 Possible alternative Moderately reduced





Significant Reduction in Contractor’s
MR margin, or exceeds original
program estimates  5-7%
0.4 Have adequate alternative Slight reduction




0.3 A few adequate alternatives Minor deficiency Slip within IPT >2 Minor within budget
Small Reduction in Contractor’s
MR margin, or exceeds original
program estimates <5%
0.2 Many adequate alternatives
Acceptable 
changes




0.1 Many adequate alternatives
No significant 
impact
Possible minor slip; 
noncritical path <1 Negligible increase
Minimal/No Impact
0.0 Many adequate alternatives
All requirements 




From (LPD 17, 2002) 
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From (DAU, 2002, p. B-17) 
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Template:  Manufacturing Plan
TRIMS Question #1:  Are design engineers aware of manufacturing 
considerations during the development evolution?
Sample Risk Description & Recommendation:  “IF the Contractor does not 
implement a concurrent engineering approach during development, THEN
Manufacturing will have to redesign the hardware to make it producible which 
will significantly impact cost and schedule, with a potential impact on 
technical performance.  IN ADDITION, design engineers are unaware of 
manufacturing needs and are not collocated with Manufacturing.  The 
Contractor should implement a concurrent engineering philosophy and involve 
all key disciplines in the design & development process.”
Cf (assess impac vent has 
occurred):  
Technical = 3:  Moderate Reduction, Work-Arounds Available
Schedule = 3:  Moderate Slip (May Affect Critical Path)
Cost = 4:  Contractor/Activity Overruns Management Reserve (MR) 
Take highest factor for Cf = 4
Risk Factor (Rf) = Pf X Cf =   5 X 4  = High Risk
Risk Level Rationale:  Significant and substantial differences exist between 
standard and best practices.  Contractor Management is not aware of the 
differences.  There is no plan or schedule in place to implement a solution.  
Risk has a High probability of impacting cost, schedule, or performance.  
No slack time to implement a solution.  An immediate high level of 
management attention is required.  
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APPENDIX D. SAMPLE RISK REPORTING METHODS 
 








































































Create white paper which explains the program
impact of a budget cut.  Include requirements
which will not be be met.
Activate our Washington D.C. office with facts and
plan for disseminating information.
Sep
1998

































GPS IMU Int Use of COTS
Mk-5 Launcher






























From (Raytheon, 1999) 
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APPENDIX G. TECHNICAL R
RESULTS 
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